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INTRODUCTION
Congress enacted the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974 ("ERISA")1 principally to ensure that employees who
accrue promised retirement benefits actually receive such benefits
for use in their retirement years.2 ERISA accomplishes this pri-
1 Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1001
(1988)). A given ERISA provision can be cited to any one of three sources: as part of
the labor title of the United States Code, Title 29; as an Internal Revenue Code
("I.R.C.") provision, title 26 of the United States Code; and as part of a commercial
edition of ERISA, published by BNA, CCH, and Prentice Hall. This confusing num-
bering is due to the fact that the I.R.C. "tends to duplicate the substantive regulation
of ERISA ... on such matters as funding and vesting." JOHN H. LANGBEiN & BRUCE
A. WOLK, PENSION AND EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAW 72 (1990). Courts customarily use
United States Code numbers together with an I.R.C. citation, if applicable. Id. at 73.
ERISA attorneys, on the other hand, tend to prefer the commercial editions of ERISA.
Id. This Note, commensurate with the tendency of the courts and in the interests of
brevity, gives only the citation to title 29 of the United States Code and, when applica-
ble, a corresponding citation to the I.R.C. For a listing of ERISA commercial edition
sections to parallel title 29, see STEPHEN R. BRUCE, PENSION CLAIMs-RIGHTS AND OBLI-
GATIONS 777-83 (2d ed. 1993).
2 Nachman Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 446 U.S. 359, 375 (1980); H.R.
REP. No. 807, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4670, 4676.
Congress found with respect to the status of pension plans after its ten year study:
[Diespite the enormous growth in [pension] plans many employees with long
years of employment are losing anticipated retirement benefits owing to the
lack of vesting [and other] provisions in such plans .... iit is therefore
desirable in the interests of employees and their beneficiaries ... that mini-
mum standards be provided assuring the equitable character of such plans
and their financial soundness.
29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (1988). Furthermore, in its declaration of ERISA policy Congress
averred:
It is hereby declared to be the policy of this Act to protect.., the interests of
participants in employee benefit plans and their beneficiaries, by requiring
the disclosure and reporting to participants and beneficiaries of financial
and other information with respect thereto, by establishing standards of con-
duct, responsibility, and obligation for fiduciaries of employee benefit plans,
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marily through its nonforfeiture ("vesting")8 and anti-alienation
("spendthrift")4 provisions.' The former protects the employee
from his employer by prohibiting forfeiture of pension benefits
once an employee meets certain minimum requirements, at which
point he becomes vested.6 The latter protects the employee from
his own spendthrift nature and from his creditors. Specifically,
the anti-alienation provision requires that "[elach pension plan
shall provide that benefits provided under the plan may not be
assigned or alienated."7 Together with ERISA's express preemp-
and by providing for appropriate remedies, sanctions, and ready access to
the Federal courts.
29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (1988). In yet another declaration of policy, Congress stressed the
improvement of the pension plan system by requiring vesting, minimum employer
funding of plans, and plan termination insurance. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(c) (1988).
The push for comprehensive federal regulation of private pension plans, which
eventually became ERISA in 1974, began with the so-called "Studebaker Incident."
See LANGsEiN & WGLK, supra note 1, at 53. In December of 1963, Studebaker closed
its automobile manufacturing plant in South Bend, Indiana and terminated its pen-
sion plan pursuant to an agreement with the United Auto Workers. Id. at 54. As a
result of massive underfunding of pension liabilities, "approximately 4,000 employees,
aged 49 to 59, who had at least ten years of service... and whose pension benefits had
therefore vested," were denied the full pension benefits they had counted on for use in
their retirement years, and only "received lump-sum payments equal to about 15% of
the actuarial value of their accrued pension benefits." Id.
Although ERISA was not enacted until 11 years later, the Studebaker Incident
served as a "battle cry" for major private pension overhaul. Id. at 54, 55. For general
discussions depicting the history of pension plans prior to ERISA's enactment and the
policy concerns leading to its enactment, see Snyder, Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974, 11 WAKE FoREsT L. REV. 219 (1975); Note, The Employee Retire-
ment Income Security Act of 1974: Policies and Problems, 26 SYRACUSE L. Rav. 539
(1975).
3 29 U.S.C. § 1053(a) (1988 & Supp. V 1993); see LR.C. § 411 (1994).
4 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1) (1988); I.R.C. § 401(a)(13) (1994). In addition to the vest-
ing and anti-alienation requirements, ERISA contains several other requirements to
ensure that an employee's pension expectations are not defeated. See 29 U.S.C.
§§ 1051-1061 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (relating to employee participation and vesting
rules); 29 U.S.C. §§ 1081-1085 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (establishing plan minimum
funding standards to increase pension plan solvency); 29 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1114 (1988 &
Supp. V 1993) (prescribing fiduciary standards and circumstances giving rise to
trustee liability for breach); 29 U.S.C. §§ 1341-1348 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (relating
to plan termination insurance).
5 It should be noted that ERISA's nonforfeiture and anti-alienation rules do not
apply to ERISA qualified employee welfare plans. See Mackey v. Lanier Collections
Agency & Serv., Inc., 486 U.S. 825 (1988).
6 See infra part I (discussing vesting and forfeiture).
7 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1) (1988). The legislative history pertaining to the purpose
of ERISA's anti-alienation rule is sparse. E.g., Ellis Nat'l Bank v. Irving Trust Co.,
786 F.2d 466, 470 (2d Cir. 1986). In its entirety, the legislative history of the anti-
alienation rule is as follows:
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tion scheme," these provisions generally secure a retirement nest
egg for the employee and his dependents.
Under the conference substitute, a plan must provide that benefits under the
plan may not be assigned or alienated. However, the plan may provide that
after a benefit is in pay status, there may be a voluntary revocable assign-
ment (not to exceed 10 percent of any benefit payment) by an employee
which is not for the purposes of defraying the administrative costs of the
plan. For purposes of this rule, a garnishment or levy is not to be considered
a voluntary assignment. Vested benefits may be used as collateral for rea-
sonable loans from a plan, where the fiduciary requirements of the law are
not violated.
H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5038, 5061 (emphasis added) (citation relating to effective date of rule omitted). One
commentator has offered a logical explanation for the paltry legislative history on the
purpose of the anti-alienation rule-"the purpose is too obvious for words." LANGBEIN
& WoLc, supra note 1, at 431. "The rule requires that the plan prevent the partici-
pant from doing indirectly what most plans forbid directly, namely, spending retire-
ment savings before retirement." Id.
Treasury Department regulations fixrther reinforce the anti-alienation provision.
See Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)-13(b)(1) (1994) ("[A] trust will not be [tax] qualified unless
the plan of which the trust is a part provides that benefits provided under the plan
may not be anticipated, assigned (either at law or in equity), alienated or subject to
attachment, garnishment, levy, execution or other legal or equitable process.").
ERISA's anti-alienation provision and the Treasury Regulation promulgated
under it bear a striking resemblance, both in language and purpose, to the spendthrift
clauses commonly seen in trust instruments. See LANGBEIN & WoLK, supra note 1, at
431. A typical spendthrift clause states language similar to the following, taken from
a litigated trust instrument: "Each beneficiary hereunder is hereby restrained from
alienating ... or in any manner assigning his ... interest.., and is without power to
do so, nor shall such interest.., be subject to his... liabilities ... nor to judgment or
other legal process.... or claims of creditors or others." Shelley v. Shelley, 354 P.2d
282, 284 (Or. 1960).
Despite this similarity, ERISA's anti-alienation provision differs significantly
from spendthrift trust law in that it is mandatory rather than exceptional. LANGBEIN
& WOLK, supra note 1, at 431. Notably ERISA's scheme provides only two creditor
exceptions-for federal tax liens, see infra part IIA.4., and family support judgments,
see infra part IIA.3.-to its spendthrift rule, whereas trust law contains several ex-
ceptions relating to a spendthrift beneficiary's creditors. See HA AusTIN W. Scorr,
THE LAw OF TRusTs §§ 157.2-157.5 (4th ed. 1987) (noting creditor exceptions for provi-
sion of necessaries, state and federal taxes, and others). Moreover, as spendthrift
trust law is exceptional rather than mandatory, "[i]t may well be held that it is
against public policy to permit the beneficiary of a spendthrift trust to enjoy an in-
come under the trust without discharging his tort liabilities to others." Id. § 157.5, at
220. At the very least, it seems it would be easier for courts to create exceptions for
tort claimants in the area of spendthrift trust law when a private citizen (referred to
as the settlor), rather than Congress, has imposed the spendthrift terms. Id. at 220,
222.
8 ERISA's preemption scheme states: "Except as provided in subsection (b) [the
"savings clause"], [ERISA] shall supersede any and all state laws insofar as they may
now or hereafter relate to any [ERISA qualified plan] ... ." 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1988)
(emphasis added). The savings clause exempts, among other things, "any law of any
State which regulates insurance, banking, or securities," 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A)
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Within the text of the ERISA statute, Congress provided cer-
tain statutory exceptions to the anti-alienation rule.9 In addition,
several courts have crafted exceptions to the rule since ERISA's
(1988), and "any generally applicable criminal law of a State," 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(4)
(1988), from the broad sweep of ERISA's preemption provisions. Furthermore, in the
so-called "deemer clause," Congress provided that no ERISA qualified pension plan or
trust established thereunder "shall be deemed to be an insurance company or other
insurer, bank, trust company, or investment company or to be engaged in the busi-
ness of insurance or banking for purposes of any law of any State purporting to regu-
late insurance companies, insurance contracts, banks, trust companies or investment
companies." 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B) (1988).
The key phrase in ERISA's preemption provision is "relate to." The Supreme
Court has emphasized the broad sweep of the preemption clause by giving the phrase
"its broad common-sense meaning, such that a state law relate[s] to' a benefit plan in
the normal sense of the phrase if it has a connection with or reference to such a
plan.'" Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724,739 (1985) (quoting
Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 97 (1983)). Furthermore, the preemption
clause does not merely preempt state laws relating to subject matter expressly cov-
ered by ERISA; instead, the legislative history indicates the clause's preemptive pow-
ers are "as broad as its language." Shaw, 463 U.S. at 98 (citing H.R. CoNF. REP. No.
1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 383 (1974); S. CoNF. REP. No. 1090, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 383
(1974)). ERISA's preemption scheme was designed to avoid "[a] patchwork scheme of
regulation," Fort Halifax Packing Co., Inc. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 11 (1987), and to
"eliminat[e] the threat of conflicting or inconsistent State and local regulation of em-
ployee benefit plans," 120 CONG. REc. 29197, 29933 (1974) (statement of Sen. Wil-
liams), so as to serve an "important policy underlying ERISA: uniform national treat-
ment of pension benefits." Patterson v. Shumate, 112 S. Ct. 2242, 2250 (1992). Thus,
ERISA has been held to preempt, for example, state testamentary laws, see MacLean
v. Ford Motor Co., 831 F.2d 723, 728 (7th Cir. 1987), and a myriad of other state laws
including state garnishment laws. See General Motors Corp. v. Bula, 623 F.2d 455,
463 (6th Cir. 1980).
Federal law, on the other hand, reigns supreme in the employee benefit field, as
ERISA's provisions are not to "be construed to alter, amend, modify, invalidate, im-
pair, or supersede any law of the United States ... or any rule or regulation issued
under any such law." 29 U.S.C. § 1144(d) (1988).
With respect to the anti-alienation rule, despite this broad supremacy language,
the Supreme Court has indicated that this clause is perhaps not as sweeping as its
language suggests. The Supreme Court declined an invitation to permit the remedial
provisions of a federal labor statute to override ERISA's bar on alienation. Guidry v.
Sheet Metal Workers Nat'l Pension Fund, 493 U.S. 365, 375 (1990). It did not view
that labor statute as being "modified, impaired or superseded" by ERISA because if
such a view was accepted, "ERISA's anti-alienation provision would be inapplicable
whenever a judgement creditor relied on the remedial provisions of a federal statute.
Such an approach would eviscerate the protections of... [the anti-alienation rule],
and... [it] declined to adopt so broad a reading of... [ERISA's federal law supremacy
language]." Id.; see infra part II.D.1. (suggesting Supreme Court's rationale here may
negate one of presently recognized exceptions to anti-alienation rule created by state
court). Thus, it can be seen that ERISA's preemption scheme indirectly reinforces the
anti-alienation provision.
9 See infra part I.A.
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enactment.10 One judicial exception, followed by the Tenth and
Eleventh Circuits prior to 1990, maintained that ERISA's anti-
alienation rule does not protect the pension benefits of an em-
ployee who has engaged in criminal acts at the expense of his em-
ployer (the "employee wrongdoing" exception).1 ' In contrast, the
Second and Sixth Circuits reached the opposite conclusion and al-
lowed the anti-alienation provision to protect the pension benefits
of employees who had criminally defrauded their employers.12 In
1990, the United States Supreme Court, in Guidry v. Sheet Metal
Workers National Pension Fund,13 resolved this conflict among
the circuits in favor of the employee-wrongdoer by broadly pro-
nouncing that there should be no "generalized equitable excep-
tion-either for employee malfeasance or for criminal miscon-
duct-to ERISA's prohibition on the assignment or alienation of
pension benefits."' 4 The Court noted the "natural distaste for the
result... [it] reach[ed]," 15 but emphasized that it is solely the role
of Congress to create such an exception. 16 Despite Supreme Court
invitation, Congress has not addressed the gross inequity created
by ERISA's provisions as construed by the Guidry Court.' Al-
10 See infra parts II.C. and II.D.
11 See St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Cox, 752 F.2d 550 (11th Cir. 1985);
Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers Natl Pension Fund, 856 F.2d 1457 (10th Cir. 1988),
rev'd, 493 U.S. 365 (1990); see also infra part ITI.A. (discussing Cox and other pre-
Guidry employee wrongdoing cases).
12 See United Metal Products Corp. v. National Bank, 811 F.2d 297 (6th Cir.
1987) cert. dismissed, 485 U.S. 1017 (1988); Ellis Nat'l Bank v. Irving Trust Co., 786
F.2d 466 (2d Cir. 1986); see also infra part flI.A. (discussing these and other pre-
Guidry employee wrongdoing cases).
13 493 U.S. 365 (1990).
14 Id. at 376.
15 Id. at 377.
16 Id.
17 The courts have been calling for the enactment of a fraud amendment since at
least 1982. See Guidry, 493 U.S. at 377 (noting "natural distaste" for result); United
Metal Products Corp. v. National Bank, 811 F.2d 297, 300 (6th Cir. 1987) (noting
despite presentment of "almost ideal case for creation of an implied exception to pen-
sion anti-alienation laws," ERISA compels unjust result); Id. at 300-01 (Wellford,
C.J., dissenting) (noting Congress could not have intended result reached by major-
ity); Ellis Nat'l Bank v. Irving Trust Co., 786 F.2d 466, 471 (2d Cir. 1986) ("Despite its
equitable appeal,... [a] 'criminal misconduct' exception... [wouldl in our view un-
dermine[ ] a fundamental purpose of ERISA that we believe should be modified, if at
all, only by Congress."); Mills v. Mills, 790 F. Supp. 172, 177 (S.D. Ohio 1992) (sharing
"natural distaste" for result compelled by Guidry and ERISA); Vink v. SHV N. Am-
Holding Corp., 549 F. Supp. 268, 273 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (noting "if ever there were a
case to carve out a 'raud' exception," this is it, but ERISA compels opposite result);
Pomeranke v. Williamson, 478 N.W.2d 800, 802 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991) (acknowledging
"natural distaste"); see also Ronald I. Kirschbaum, ERISA Spendthrift Rules - It Just
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lowing Guidry to serve as precedent in subsequent employee
wrongdoing cases and potentially deter defrauded employers from
bringing suit to recoup their losses on behalf, albeit indirectly, of
its employees, is contrary to recognized principles of restitution,
equity, spendthrift trust law, and the prevention of unjust enrich-
ment. This result, despite legislative inaction, cannot be attrib-
uted to congressional design.
This Note contains six parts. Part I explains the mechanics of
ERISA's nonforfeiture rule as it relates to the anti-alienation rule
and draws a distinction between the two rules to identify the im-
pediments to creating a criminal fraud exception. Part II compiles
the presently recognized exceptions to ERISA's anti-alienation
provision. Part III reviews the employee wrongdoing cases that
preceded Guidry and examines those cases decided after it. Part
IV proposes a criminal fraud amendment to ERISA's anti-aliena-
tion rule. Part V examines the reasons why Congress is reluctant
to enact such an amendment. As an alternative, Part VI calls for
the Supreme Court to reconsider the position it adopted in Guidry
and suggests a legal method by which the judiciary could create
an exception for criminal fraud.
I. NoNFoRFEIruRE AS IT RE;LATES TO ANTI-ALiENATION
Except as it relates to the anti-alienation provision, ERISA's
nonforfeiture rule is beyond the scope of this Note. A basic under-
standing of this rule, however, is necessary for an appreciation of
this anti-alienation rule and the employee wrongdoing cases dis-
cussed herein.
A forfeiture must be distinguished from an alienation. A
forfieture results in a reversion of pension benefits back to the em-
ployer. An alienation, on the other hand, results in the assign-
ment, garnishment, or attachment of an employee's pension bene-
fits by a third party. In some of the employee wrongdoing cases
discussed herein, it is important to note that employers were not
seeking to effect a reversion of a convicted employee's pension ben-
Shouldn't Be This Hard, 11 CAMPBELL L. Ruv. 29, 46-52 (1988) (exploring inequity of
employee wrongdoing cases); Note, Employee Theft and ERISA: A Proposed Amend-
ment to Garnish Pension Benefits, 10 CARDOZO L. REv. 315, 338-40 (1988) [hereinafter
Employee Theft and ERISA] (noting inequity of wrongdoer cases which rejected im-
plied fraud exception and proposing model amendment); Comment, ERISA-Excep-
tions to the Anti-Alienation Provision: Strengthening ERISA's Protection through a
Fraud Amendment, 10 W. NEw. ENG. L. REv. 317, 352-57 (1988) [hereinafter
Strengthening ERISA's Protection] (same).
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efits through forfeiture, but rather to garnish the pension benefits
of the defalcating employees that had stolen from them.'8
ERISA's nonforfeiture provision mandates that "[e]ach pension
plan shall provide that an employee's right to his normal retire-
ment benefit is nonforfeitable upon the attainment of normal re-
tirement age."' 9 Thus, forfeiture, such as reversion back to the
employer, of vested rights are prohibited except as expressly pro-
vided in ERISA.2 °
There are three ways for an employer to comply with ERISA's
vesting requirements: immediate vesting, cliff vesting, and gradu-
ated vesting.2 ' As the name suggests, pension plans that provide
for immediate vesting require that each employee's pension bene-
fits be fully vested at all times; there is no possibility, therefore, of
forfeiture of an employee's pension benefits even when the em-
ployee has left the employer.22 Far more common than immediate
vesting is a cliff-vesting schedule, under which an employee's pen-
sion benefits are wholly forfeitable and do not become wholly
vested until he satisfies a minimum number of years of service.2 3
Currently, ERISA sets the maximum allowable period for cliff-
vesting at five years,24 so that an employee's benefits are wholly
forfeitable until he completes five years of service.25 In contrast,
graduated vesting affords an employee greater forfeiture protec-
tion as his years of service increase.26 Currently, ERISA permits
18 See, e.g., Vink, 549 F. Supp. at 268 (discussed infra part III.A.).
19 29 U.S.C. § 1053(a) (1988 & Supp. V 1993); see I.R.C. § 411 (1988 & Supp. V
1993).
20 Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 511 (1981); see 29 U.S.C.
§ 1053(a)(3) (1988) (enumerating grounds for permissible forfeiture).
21 LANGBEIN & WOLK, supra note 1, at 93-94. Immediate vesting is uncommon
but is exemplified by the defined contribution plan of the TIAA-CREF system. Id. at
93.
22 Id.
23 Id. at 94.
24 29 U.S.C. 1053(a)(2)(A) (1988); see Freeman v. Central States, Southeast & S.
Areas Pension Fund, 32 F.3d 90, 93 (4th Cir. 1994) (stating if single-employer plan
chooses "cliff" vesting, ERISA requires that cliff be encountered after no more than
five years); Moeller v. Bertrang, 801 F. Supp. 291, 296 (N.D.S.D. 1992) (describing
defendant's five-year cliff vesting plan).
25 See Swaida v. IBM Retirement Plan, 570 F. Supp. 482 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (ex-
plaining that ERISA formerly allowed 10 year cliff vesting and, therefore, employee
with 9 years and 11 months service could receive no pension benefits), aff'd per
curiam, 728 F.2d 159 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 874 (1984); LANGBEIN & WOLF,
supra note 1, at 94 (as originally enacted in 1974, ERISA allowed ten-year cliff
vesting).
26 LANGBEIN & WOLK, supra note 1, at 94 (explaining graduated vesting); see
Stewart v. National Shopmen Pension Fund, 730 F.2d 1552, 1558 n.12 (D.C. Cir.)
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seven year graduated vesting. 7 At least a portion of an em-
ployee's benefits, therefore, could be forfeited prior to the comple-
tion of seven years of service.28 ERISA, however, mandates that
an employee's rights to "benefit[s] derived from his own contribu-
tions [be in all events] nonforfeitable."29
Prior to the enactment of ERISA, a common scenario under
which an employee forfeited his pension benefits occurred when
the employer invoked a so-called "bad boy" clause.30  These
clauses generally gave employers discretion to decide whether an
employee would forfeit his vested pension benefits because of al-
leged acts of dishonesty or fraud, or in the case of a former em-
ployee, for competing with his former employer.3 1 For all intents
and purposes, ERISA foreclosed the use of "bad boy" clauses, as its
vesting rules provide no exception allowing for the imposition of
forfeiture except, of course, for the periods permitted under ER-
ISA's regular vesting schedules.3 2
(stating pension plan can provide for graduated vesting), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 834
(1984).
27 29 U.S.C. § 1053(a)(2)(B) (1988); see I.R.C. § 411(a)(2)(B) (1988); Freeman, 32
F.3d at 93 n.8 (single-employer plans may delay full vesting for up to seven years as
long as partial vesting is phased in according to schedule prescribed in 29 U.S.C.
§ 1053(d)(2)(B) (1988)).
28 See LANGBEIN & WOLK, supra note 1, at 93-98 (discussing workings of vesting
schedules); Russell K. Osgood, Qualified Pension and Profit-Sharing Plan Vesting:
Revolution Not Reform, 59 B.U. L. REv. 452, 456-57 (1979) (same).
29 29 U.S.C. § 1053(a)(1) (1988), I.R.C. § 411(a)(1) (1988).
30 See Ellis Natl Bank v. Irving Trust Co., 786 F.2d 466, 470 n.4 (2d Cir. 1986)
(stating 'bad boy" defense was used by employers who have sought to forfeit on pay-
ing benefits); Winer v. Edison Bros. Store Pension Plan, 593 F.2d 307, 311 (8th Cir.
1979) (stating that plans contained "bad boy" clauses which denied employees their
otherwise nonforfeitable pension benefits).
31 Vink v. SHV N. Am. Holding Corp., 549 F. Supp. 268, 270 (S.D.N.Y.); see
Nedrow v. MacFarlane & Hays Co. Employees' Profit Sharing Plan & Trust, 476 F.
Supp. 934, 935-36 (E.D. Mich. 1979) (citing text of typical "bad boy" provision); John
W. Lee, ERISA's "Bad Boy". Forfeiture For Cause in Retirement Plans, 9 Loy. U. Cm.
L.J. 137, 161-68 (1977) (discussing "bad boy" clauses that preceded ERISA); Ellis
Nat'l Bank, 786 F.2d at 470 n.4; Winer, 593 F.2d at 311.
32 See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1053(a)(2)-(3) (Supp. V 1993) (discussing vesting schedules);
Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 511 (1980) (noting that forfeitures
of vested rights are prohibited except as expressly provided in 29 U.S.C. § 1053(a)(3));
Winer, 593 F.2d at 311 ("The legislative history is clear.., that... [ERISA's vesting
provisions were] designed, in part, to prevent further enforcement of 'bad boy'
clauses."); H.R. REP. No. 807, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 60 (1974), reprinted in 1974
U.S.C.A.A.N. 4639, 4726 (citation omitted) ("[A] vested benefit is not to be forfeited
because the employee later went to work for a competitor, or in some other way was
considered 'disloyal' to the employer."). But see Gary V. Lawson & Roberta Casper
Watson, Forfeiture-for-Cause "Bad Boy" Clauses: Is There Any Life Left After ERISA?
- Confusion in the Arena?, 60 TAXES 827, 828 (1982) (emphasis added) (noting "limited
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As was stated earlier, this Note addresses the distinction be-
tween forfeiture and alienation because in most employee wrong-
doing cases the employer seeks to effect an alienation, and not a
forfeiture, of the pension benefits of an employee who has de-
frauded the employer. This distinction is important because
courts have proceeded under the erroneous assumption that both
the nonforfeiture and anti-alienation rules are impediments to
creating an exception for criminal fraud, when in reality only the
anti-alienation rule should have been deemed as such an impedi-
ment.3 3 Furthermore, when the Department of Labor ("DOL")
joined as amicus curiae to contest the creation of a criminal fraud
exception, it did so in a case in which the employer was acting in
the role of forfeitor and not alienator. 4 Subsequent courts, how-
ever, construed the DOL's appearance to mean that it disfavored a
criminal fraud exception when an employer sought not to forfeit,
but to alienate, an employee's pension benefits. 5 It is suggested,
however, that when the DOL joined as amicus, it was concerned
not with an exception to the alienation mandate where an em-
ployee has been convicted of embezzlement, but only with the en-
forcement of "bad boy" clauses, the use of which ERISA was in-
tended to foreclose.3 6 It is misleading, therefore, to state that the
DOL was against a criminal fraud exception in all cases.
bad boy" clauses "have been enforced by the courts... because the employer utilized a
vesting schedule more liberal than those required by ERISA"); Montgomery v. Lowe,
507 F. Supp. 618, 621 (S.D. Tex. 1981) ("[A]n employer may cause interests to vest
sooner, or to a greater extent, than ERISA mandates. The employer's generosity enti-
tles it to subject the 'excess' vested interest to any forfeiture conditions it chooses to
impose, including a 'bad boy' clause."); Treas. Reg. § 1.411(a)-4(a) (1994) ("To the ex-
tent that rights are not required to be nonforfeitable to satisfy the minimum vesting
standards... they may be forfeited ... ."). See also infra part I (discussing "bad boy"
clauses as they relate to anti-alienation rule and employee wrongdoing cases).
33 See, e.g., Vink, 549 F. Supp. 268 (discussed infra part MA.).
34 See Winer, 593 F.2d at 310; infra note 98 (discussing Vink case and DOL
position).
35 See Vink, 549 F. Supp. at 271; Ellis Natl Bank v. Irving Trust Co., 786 F.2d
466,471 (2d Cir. 1986); United Metal Products Corp. v. National Bank, 811 F.2d 297,
299 (6th Cir. 1987), cert. dismissed, 485 U.S. 1017 (1988). For a discussion of these
and other employee wrongdoing cases, see infra part m1A.
36 See supra note 32 and accompanying text (citing legislative materials evincing
intent to disallow "bad boy" enforcement).
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II. THE PRESENTLY RECOGNIZED EXCEPrIONS TO ERISA's ANTI-
ALIENATION PROVISION
A The Statutory Exceptions
1. The Ten Percent Exception
An employee (the plan participant) can make a voluntary and
revocable assignment of not more than ten percent of any pension
benefit when the plan is in pay status."7
2. Loans
Under certain circumstances, a plan participant can obtain a
loan from the pension plan.38 These loans, however, may carry
potential adverse tax consequences under ERISA's sister provi-
sions in the Internal Revenue Code ("IRC"). 9
3. The Family Support Exception
The Retirement Equity Act of 1984 ("REA) 40 amended
ERISA to provide that the anti-alienation rule does not apply to
assignments made pursuant to a "qualified domestic relations or-
der" ("QDRO"). 41 A QDRO is defined as a state judgment entered
in connection with, inter alia, divorce and child support
proceedings.42
37 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(2) (1988); see In re Pulley, 111 B.R. 715, 744 (Bankr. N.D.
Ind. 1989) (stating pension plan may delay voluntary revocable assignment not ex-
ceeding 10%); Commercial Mortgage Ins. Inc. v. Citizen Natl Bank, 526 F. Supp. 510
(N.D. Tex. 1981) (same); see also supra note 7 (citing legislative history with respect to
10% exception).
38 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d) (2) (1988). The loan must be "secured by the participant's
accrued nonforfeitable benefit." Id. Although loans to interested parties of a pension
plan are generally prohibited by ERISA, see 29 U.S.C. § 1106(a)(1)(B) (1988), secured
loans to plan participants are specifically exempted from the prohibited transactions
section of ERISA. See 29 U.S.C. § 1108(b)(1) (1988); see also supra note 7 (citing legis-
lative history with respect to employee loans).
39 See I.R.C. §§ 401(a)(13), 4975(d)(1) (1988) (explaining these circumstances).
40 Pub. L. No. 98-397, 98 Stat. 1426 (1984).
41 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(A) (1988).
42 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(B) (1988). In addition to QDRO protection, REA re-
quires pension plans to provide two separate procedures to protect the employee's
spouse from forfeiture of pension benefits upon the employee's death.
First, if the participant survives to retirement age, [REA] requires that his
or her annuity be a "qualified joint and survivor annuity" (QJSA), under
which payments continue for the lives both of the employee and of the non-
employee spouse. Second, if the participant dies before retirement and is
vested [REA] makes the nonemployee spouse into a plan beneficiary, whose
interest in the plan survives the participant's death. [REA] entitles the sur-
viving spouse to a "qualified preretirement survivor annuity" (QPSA).
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Prior to the enactment of REA, the courts were split on
whether there was an implied exception to the anti-alienation rule
for family support judgments. 43 Several courts had difficulty cre-
ating such an exception because of the anti-alienation mandate,
but also because ERISA preempts "any and all State laws insofar
as they may now or hereinafter relate to" an ERISA pension
plan.4 Consequently, in addition to the QDRO provision, REA ef-
fected a conforming amendment to ERISA exempting QDROs
from ERISA's state law preemption provision.4
4. Federal Tax Liens
Federal tax liens can attach ERISA pension plans.46 This is
because ERISA's preemption clause clearly states that its provi-
LANGBEIN & WOLK, supra note 1, at 434. Prior to the enactment of REA, there were
provisions for QJSAs and QPSAs. The plan participant, however, and not the nonem-
ployee spouse, possessed the power to elect or forego the QJSA or QPSA. Id. at 435,
438. REA's major reform in the survivor annuity area was to transfer the power to
decline a spouse's congressionally mandated QJSA or QPSA entitlement from the
plan participant to the nonemployee spouse. Id. Furthermore, ERISA provides that a
plan participant cannot effect a waiver of the QJSA or QPSA entitlement without
spousal consent. Id. at 435, 438-39. Congress provided very specific rules with re-
spect to how and when a nonemployee spouse may elect to waive these entitlements.
For a further discussion of those rules and QPSAs generally as they relate to the
state-killer-law exception to ERISA's anti-alienation rule, see infra part V.
43 Compare, American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Merry, 592 F.2d 118, 124 (2d Cir. 1979)
(creating implied family support exception based on ERISA's policy of protecting both
employees and their dependents) with Francis v. United Technologies Corp., 458 F.
Supp. 84, 86 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (holding ERISA's preemption and anti-alienation provi-
sions prevent application of state community property law authorizing attachment of
pension benefits for family support judgments). For a brief summary of the argu-
ments in favor of the creation of an implied exception to the anti-alienation rule for
family support judgments, see Cartledge v. Miller, 457 F. Supp. 1146, 1154-58
(S.D.N.Y. 1978) (reasoning that purpose of ERISA was "not to insulate a breadwinner
from valid support of spouse and offspring"). See Michael T. Murray, Note, The Fraud
Exception to ERISA's Anti-Alienation Provision: A Permissible Exercise of the Chan-
cellor's Powers?, 57 FoRDHA L. REV. 835, 843-45 (1988); see also infra part VI.B.
(suggesting that these arguments are no more compelling than those that favor crimi-
nal fraud exception proposed herein).
44 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1988) (emphasis added).
45 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(7) (Supp. V 1993).
46 E.g., In re Anderson, 149 B.R. 591, 594 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1992). In contrast,
state garnishments, levies, and civil judgments, which do not fall within any excep-
tion to ERISA's anti-alienation and preemption provisions, cannot attach ERISA pen-
sion plans. See Arizona Laborers, Teamsters, & Cement Masons, Local 395 Pension
Trust Fund v. Nevarez, 661 F. Supp. 365, 368 (D. Ariz. 1987) (holding that plaintiff
cannot execute writ of garnishment against pension funds); Cody v. Riecker, 454 F.
Supp. 22, 24 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) (holding that anti-alienation clause and Treasury Regu-
lations confirm that ERISA precludes both voluntary and involuntary alienations),
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sions do not "supersede any law of the United States... or any
rule or regulation issued under any such law."47 Thus, section
6321 of the IRC, which under certain circumstances creates a lien
"upon all property and rights to property,"4 and does not exempt
pension benefits,49 operates to effectuate federal tax liens on
ERISA pension plans. Furthermore, both the Treasury Depart-
ment and the DOL are empowered to enforce and interpret ER-
ISA,50 and while the Treasury's interpretation that federal tax
liens are exempt from ERISA's anti-alienation provision is not
controlling, it is afforded great weight."1
aff'd, 594 F.2d 314 (2d Cir. 1979); Treas. Reg. 1.401(a)-13(b)(1) (1994) ("[Blenefits pro-
vided under the plan may not be anticipated, assigned (either at law or in equity),
alienated or subject to attatchment, garnishment, levy, execution or other legal or
equitable process."). But see Retirement Fund Trust v. Franchise Tax Bd., 909 F.2d
1266 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding state withholding tax does not violate ERISA's anti-
alienation rule).
The Supreme Court has made it clear that the alienation prohibition dictates that
a debtor in bankruptcy may exclude his interest in an ERISA qualified plan from his
bankruptcy estate in furtherance of an "important policy underlying ERISA: uniform
national treatment of pension benefits." Patterson v. Shumate, 112 S. Ct. 2242, 2250
(1992); see also BRUCE, supra note 1, at 297-98 (noting split among circuits prior to
Patterson, which adopted minority view). See generally Noel C. Ice, What Are Credi-
tors'Rights in Retirement Plan Benefits?, 21 EsT. PLAN. 30 (Jan.-Feb. 1994) (explain-
ing far reaching effect of Patterson).
47 29 U.S.C. § 1144(d) (1988).
48 I.R.C. § 6321 (1988).
49 See I.R.C. § 6334 (1988); see also id. at § 6331 (relating to levy and distraint).
5o See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1242 (1988); General Motors Corp. v. Buha, 623 F.2d
455, 461 (6th Cir. 1980) (relying on administrative interpretations of the anti-assign-
ment provision of ERISA). ERISA specifically authorizes the Treasury Department to
prescribe the regulations relating to minimum participation, vesting, and funding
standards as those standards appear in the sister provisions of ERISA in the Internal
Revenue Code. 29 U.S.C. 1202(c) (1988); see H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 1280, 93d Cong., 2d
Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C-.N. 5038, 5139 (explaining import of 29 U.S.C.
§ 1202(c)). Pursuant to this authority, the Treasury Department issued regulations
reinforcing the anti-alienation rule. See Treas. Reg. 1.401(a)-13(b)(1) (1994). Not sur-
prisingly, however, the regulations recognize an exception to the anti-alienation rule
for the "enforcement of a federal tax levy" or the "collection by the United States of a
judgment resulting from an unpaid tax assessment." Treas. Reg. 1.401(a)-13(b)(2)
(1994); see also BRUCE, supra note 1, at 299 (explaining Treasury Regulation and cit-
ing cases); infra note 210 (explaining DOL formerly had authority to regulate).
51 See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
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B. The Regulatory Benefit Overpayment Exception
Treasury Regulations permit plans to provide "for the recov-
ery... of overpayments of benefits previously made to a partici-
pant" without violating the anti-alienation rule. 2
C. State Killer Laws
When a surviving ERISA spouse who is otherwise entitled to
a "qualified preretirement survival annuity" ("QPSA) 5 3 is con-
victed of killing his or her spouse, he or she is precluded from en-
joying the deceased spouse's pension benefits notwithstanding
ERISA's anti-alienation and preemption provisions. 4
52 Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)-13(c)(2)(iii) (1994); see also Larsen v. NMU Pension Plan
Trust, 767 F. Supp. 554, 558 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) ("Adjusting plaintiff's damages to reflect
the [overpayment] offset... would not run afoul of ERISA's anti-alienation rule ....
To disregard $5800 in benefits plaintiff would not have received but for [the overpay-
ment] ... would constitute a windfall to the plaintiff at the expense of other Plan
participants.") (citation omitted); BRUCE, supra note 1, at 299-300 (discussing DOL
regulations consistent with Treasury Department position on recoupment of
overpayments).
53 See supra note 42 (discussing QPSAs).
54 See New Orleans Elec. Pension Fund v. Newman, 784 F. Supp. 1233, 1236
(E.D. La. 1992); see also Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,000 (June 16, 1983) ("ITihere is an
implied exception to... [the anti-alienation rule] for purposes of applying the com-
mon law principle that a killer should not benefit from his or her own crime."); cf New
Orleans Elec. Pension Fund v. DeRocha, 779 F. Supp. 845, 851 (E.D. La. 1991) (hold-
ing surviving ERISA spouse convicted of manslaughter of husband not entitled to
QPSA benefits, but no anti-alienation argument raised); Mendez-Bellido v. Board of
Trustees, 709 F. Supp. 329, 334 (E.D.N.Y. 1989) (same).
The Newman court stated that "[w]hether a certain state action is preempted by
federal law is one of congressional intent... and this Court finds that Congress did
not intend ERISA to preempt state laws which prohibit murderers from reaping fi-
nancial benefits as a result of their crimes." Newman, 784 F. Supp. at 1236 (citing
Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 45 (1987)). The court discussed an addi-
tional basis to deny the defendant benefits even if ERISA did preempt the state killer
statutes, despite the anti-alienation rule and her congressionally mandated entitle-
ment to a QPSA. Id. The court found the defendants admission that she was an
"unworthy heir" as defined under Louisiana civil law sufficient to constitute a "waiver
[that] does not contravene the anti-alienation provision[ I of ERISA," id., nor "[t]he
ERISA provisions on waiver.., of a QPSA." Id. at 1237.
With respect to the anti-alienation mandate, the court reasoned that the
Supreme Court's decision in Guidry "is not offended by this Court's decision that the
policy considerations that underlie the 'iller statutes' provide an implied exception to
the anti-alienation rule." Id. at 1237. Regarding finding that Mrs. Newman waived
her entitlement to the QPSA, the court reasoned that "Mrs. Newman's voluntary par-
ticipation in a state court order declaring her unworthy for having killed the plan
participant fulfills the legal requirement of a written waiver of the QPSA." Newman,
784 F. Supp. at 1238; see infra part V (questioning entire line of reasoning in New-




D. The Employee Wrongdoing Exceptions
1. An Exception for State Criminal Restitution Orders?-
Not Exactly
In New Jersey v. Pulasty,55 the New Jersey Superior Court,
Appellate Division, held that ERISA's anti-alientation rule does
not protect the pension benefits of an employee-wrongdoer who is
ordered to pay restitution to his employer under the authority of a
state criminal statute. 6 On appeal, however, the New Jersey
Supreme Court modified the lower court's ruling and made it clear
that it was not creating an exception to ERISA's anti-alienation
clause for New Jersey's criminal restitution statute.5 7 Rather, be-
cause Pulasty's pension benefits were being paid to him and were,
thus, no longer in the pension plan, the anti-alienation clause was
not applicable.58 The restitution order, therefore, which did not
offend ERISA's preemption clause,59 could be satisfied from Pu-
lasty's stream of unprotected pension benefits.6 °
In Pulasty, the treasurer of the State Fireman's Association
embezzled more than $600,000 and, pursuant to a plea bargain,
was ordered by the trial court to remit approximately $453,300 to
his employer in accordance with the restitution provision of a New
Jersey criminal statute.6" The restitution order stipulated that
"the defendant is to assign all rights to his [ERISA qualified] pen-
sion" to his former employer.62 Pulasty appealed, citing Guidry
for the proposition that even criminal wrongdoer's pension bene-
fits are unassailable in light of ERISA's anti-alienation provision.
The Appellate Division, however, distinguished Guidry on the
ground that the case involved a civil judgment whereas Pulasty
involved the involuntary assignment of pension benefits pursuant
to a state criminal restitution statute, which is not preempted
It is suggested that the judicial creation of this exception, while just and consis-
tent with the result advocated herein, cannot be reconciled with the Supreme Court's
interpretation of ERISA's anti-alientation rule in Guidry.
55 612 A.2d 952 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992), aff'd on other grounds, 642 A.2d
1392 (N.J.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 579 (1994).
56 Id. at 953.
57 New Jersey v. Pulasty, 642 A.2d 1392, 1394 (N.J.) (per curiam) cert. denied,
115 S. Ct. 579 (1994). ("Our decision today creates no exception to ERISA's non-alien-
ability clause.").
58 Id.
59 Id.; accord Brosamer v. Mark, 561 N.E.2d 767, 769 (Ind. 1990).
60 Pulasty, 642 A.2d at 1394.
61 Pulasty, 612 A.2d at 953.
62 Id.
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under ERISA.63 The court held that ERISA was "not [meant] to
eliminate a legitimate sentencing tool of the state criminal
court."
6 4
The Appellate Division based its reasoning on the fact that
the ERISA preemption clause exempts "any generally applicable
criminal law of a State."65 Notwithstanding the fact that ERISA's
provisions "supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may
now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan,"66 the court
asserted that "the restitution provision of... [the New Jersey
criminal statute] is a generally applicable criminal law and does
not 'relate to' an employee benefit plan; thus it is not preempted
by ERISA."67 As was noted earlier, the New Jersey Supreme
Court affirmed the Appellate Division's decision but on different
grounds. It refused to adopt the Appellate Division's assertion
that, when pension benefits still remain in the pension plan and
have yet to be paid out, the anti-alienation clause applies to civil
judgments like the one in Guidry but not to criminal restitution
orders. 68
In light of the Supreme Court's rationale in Guidry,69 the
New Jersey Supreme Court correctly recognized that the United
States Supreme Court would probably not agree that the entry of
a criminal restitution judgment renders the anti-alienation clause
inapplicable to pension benefits that still remain in a pension
plan. Although "generally applicable criminal law[s]" are specifi-
cally exempted from ERISA's preemption provision, so too was the
remedial provision in the federal statute considered in Guidry,
which the Supreme Court would not let override the anti-aliena-
tion provision. It seems the Supreme Court would not allow the
remedial provisions of a state criminal law, though of general ap-
plicability, to override the anti-alienation protection afforded to
pension assets that remain in a pension plan. Such a statute
would, like the federal statute considered in Guidry, "eviscerate
the protections of ... [the anti-alienation rule]." °
63 Id. at 957.
64Id.
65 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(4) (1988) (emphasis added).
66 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1988) (emphasis added).
67 Pulasty, 612 A.2d at 958 (emphasis added).
68 Pulasty, 642 A.2d at 1392, 1394 (N.J. 1994) (per curiam).
69 See supra note 8 (discussing Supreme Court's rationale).




2. Fiduciaries of the Plan
Both the District of Columbia Circuit and the Third Circuit
have held that ERISA's anti-alienation rule does not protect the
benefits of an employee-wrongdoer who is a plan fiduciary71 who
71 ERISA's definition of who is a plan fiduciary casts a wide net. LANGBEIN &
WOLK, supra note 1, at 485 ("[t]he definition of a fiduciary is extraordinarily broad").
For a recent Supreme Court decision evidencing just how far this net can be cast, see
John Hancock Life Ins. Co. v. Harris Bank, 114 S. Ct. 517, 523 (1993) (determining
who is a plan fiduciary is "guided a single sentence or member of a sentence, but
look[ing] to the provisions of the whole law, and its object and policy") (quoting Pilot
Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 51 (1987) (citation omitted)).
A person is a fiduciary with respect to an employee benefit plan "to the extent (i)
he exercises any discretionary authority or discretionary control respecting manage-
ment of such plan or exercises any authority or control respecting management or
disposition of its assets.... " 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A) (1988) (emphasis added). Fur-
thermore, ERISA mandates that any fiduciary who breaches duties owed to a pension
plan, "shall be personally liable to make good to such plan any losses to the plan
resulting from each such breach.., and shall be subject to such other equitable or
remedial relief as the court may deem appropriate .... " 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a) (1988)
(emphasis added). See LANGBEIN & WOLK, supra note 1, at 517-37 (discussing exclu-
sive benefit rule, duty to diversify, and other duties owed). ERISA's legislative his-
tory evidences an intent to confer a broad range of equitable powers upon the courts to
fashion remedies for fiduciary breach-including recourse to principles of traditional
trust law:
Neither existing State nor Federal law has been effective in preventing or
correcting many... [fiduciary] abuses. Accordingly, the legislation imposes
strict fiduciary obligations on those who have discretion or responsibility re-
specting the management, handling, or disposition of pension.., plan as-
sets. The objectives of these provisions are to make applicable the law of
trusts; ... to establish uniform fiduciary standards to prevent transactions
which dissipate or endanger plan assets; and to provide effective remedies
for breaches of trust.
120 CONG. REC. S-15737 (daily ed. Aug. 22, 1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5177, 5186 (statement of Sen. Harrison A. Williams, Jr.) (emphasis added); see also S.
REP. No. 127, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A-N. 4838, 4871
("The intent of the committee is to provide the full range of legal and equitable reme-
dies available in both state and federal courts. .... ").
Trust law instructs that a breaching trustee should not be allowed to benefit from
his own transgressions. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 205 cmt. i
(1957) (breaching trustee is liable for profits that would have accrued in absence of
breach). Furthermore, the constructive trust has long been recognized as a method to
prevent the unjust enrichment of a trustee who has fraudulently divested a trust.
See, e.g., AusTN W. ScoTr, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 495 (1939) ("A constructive trust
arises when a person in a fiduciary relation acquires or retains property, in violation
of his duty as a fiduciary."); Askins v. Easterling, 347 P.2d 126, 131 (Colo. 1959) (stat-
ing that grantor's attempt to convey property in violation of plaintiff's one-half inter-
est is sufficient to void deed and create constructive trust in favor of plaintiff);
Unicure, Inc. v. Thurman, 599 P.2d 925, 927 (Colo. Ct. App. 1979) (declaring that
constructive trust is appropriate remedy for breach of fiduciary duty).
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breached a fiduciary duty owed to the plan.72 The Fifth Circuit,
on the other hand, has held that the anti-alienation rule protects
the pension benefits of a fiduciary regardless of whether it was
proven that the fiduciary breached the ERISA fiduciary duties he
owed to the plan.73
The Supreme Court addressed a similar situation in Guidry.
There exists a distinction, however, that is vital to understanding
the inapposite results reached by the Guidry Court and those of
the Third and D.C. Circuits. In Guidry, a union official pled guilty
to embezzling more than $377,000 from his union in violation of
section 501(c) of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure
Act of 1959 ("LMRDA").74 Although the union alleged a breach of
fiduciary duty under the LMRDA, there was no showing that Gui-
dry breached a fiduciary duty to the pension plan itself. Thus,
there was no violation of ERISA's provisions relating to fiduciary
duties.75 Therefore, because there was no breach of fiduciary duty
to the plan itself, the anti-alienation clause protected Guidry's
pension benefits, and the union could not indirectly recoup its
losses on behalf of its members 76 "[a]lthough... [Guidry's] actions
may have harmed the Union's members who are the beneficiaries
of the funds."77 The Court specifically left open the question
whether a pension plan is able to offset a judgment against a fidu-
72 Crawford v. LaBoucherie Bernard, Ltd., 815 F.2d 117, 121 (D.C. Cir.), cert. de-
nied sub nom. Goldstein v. Crawford, 484 U.S. 943 (1987); Coar v. Kazimir, 990 F.2d
1413, 1414 (3d Cir. 1993); see Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. Solmsen, 743 F. Supp.
125, 129 (E.D.N.Y. 1990) (evidencing consistent holding at district court level).
73 Herberger v. Shanbaum, 897 F.2d 801,804 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 817
(1990) (holding anti-alienation clause protects fiduciary's pension benefits despite
breach of fiduciary duty to plan). The Fifth Circuit specifically declined to follow
Crawford, quoting dicta from the Guidry decision which "underminetd] the Crawford
reasoning." Id.; cf McLaughlin v. Lindemann, 853 F.2d 1307, 1309 (5th Cir. 1988)
(holding anti-alienation rule prevents offset of pension benefits against judgment en-
tered for knowing participation by nonfiduciary third party in breach of fiduciary duty
by plan trustee). The McLaughlin court noted that since the defendant was a nonfi-
duciary, "whether the holding in Crawford was proper is a matter... [that] need not
[be] decidefd]." Id.
74 Guidry, 493 U.S. at 367-68; see 29 U.S.C. § 501(c). Section 501(c) provides for a
fine or imprisonment for officers or employees who steal or embezzle from their union.
Id.
75 Guidry, 493 U.S. 375-76; see supra note 71 (discussing fiduciary duties).




ciary's pension benefits when the judgment is predicated on a
breach of the fiduciary duties he owed to the plan.7"
In contrast, the circuit court cases all addressed the precise
question left open by the Guidry Court. And although two of the
three circuit courts that have considered the issue subscribe to the
breaching fiduciary exception to the anti-alienation rule, it is sug-
gested that should the Supreme Court address the issue, it would
not agree with that majority.
In an apparent contradiction, the Supreme Court denied cer-
tiorari to the D.C. Circuit, which created a breaching fiduciary ex-
ception, and also to the Fifth Circuit, which refused to create a
breaching fiduciary exception. However, the D.C. Circuit decided
Crawford v. La Baucherie Bernard, Ltd. three years before Guidry
while the Fifth Circuit (which refused to create the exception) de-
cided Herberger v. Shanbaum just months after the Supreme
Court considered Guidry. Since the denial of certiorari in Her-
berger occurred just months after it decided Guidry, it would seem
that the Supreme Court would refuse to permit the breaching fi-
duciary exception. Consider the following passage from Guidry:
As a general matter, courts should be loath to announce equita-
ble exceptions to legislative requirements or prohibitions that
are unqualified by the statutory text. The creation of such excep-
tions, in our view, would be especially problematic in the context
of an antigarnish ent provision. Such a provision acts, by defi-
nition, to hinder the collection of a lawful debt. A restriction on
garnishment therefore can be defended only on the view that the
effectuation of certain broad social policies sometimes takes prece-
dence over the desire to do equity between particular parties. It
makes little sense to adopt such a policy and then to refuse en-
forcement whenever enforcement appears inequitable .... The im-
practicability of defining such a standard reinforces our conclu-
78 See id. at 373 ("We need not decide whether the remedial provisions contained
in... [29 U.S.C. 1109(a)] supersede the bar on alienation... since... [Guidry] has
not been found to have breached any fiduciary duty to the pension plans.") (emhasis
omitted). The question that the Guidry court faced was not whether ERISA's provi-
sion for fiduciary breaches to pension plans superseded the anti-alienation clause, but
rather whether the authorization of "other appropriate relief" under § 501(b) of the
Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 overrode the prohibition on
alienation. Guidry, 493 U.S. at 374-75.
Despite the fact that the Court left open the question as to a breaching fiduciary,
the Fifth Circuit in Herberger found the Guidry dicta persuasive enough to disallow
an offset in a case in which a fiduciary breached his fiduciary duty as trustee of a
pension plan. See supra note 73.
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sion that the identification of any exception should be left to
Congress. 7
9
The Herberger court considered the Court's dicta sufficiently
persuasive to undermine the reasoning of Crawford. The
Supreme Court apparently agreed when it denied certiorari.
On the other hand, the Coar court rejected Herberger's rea-
soning as "constru[ing] Guidry's holding too broadly and plac[ing]
insufficient emphasis on the wording of... [the fiduciary and anti-
alienation rules] and ERISA's legislative history." 1 Instead, the
Coar court chose to hang its interpretive hat on congressional in-
tent, reasoning that "Congress did not intend to allow an individ-
ual such as Coar to collect pension benefits prior to satisfying his
liabilities to the fund,"8 2 and reading the anti-alienation rule
"and, by extension Guidry, as shielding only the beneficiaries' in-
terest under the pension plan from third party creditors."83
III. THE NONFIDUCIARY-EMPLOYEE WRONGDOING CASE LAw
With the exceptions to the anti-alienation rule as a back-
ground, the purpose of this Note is to propose an amendment to
ERISA's anti-alienation provision, and in the alternative, a legal
method by which the judiciary might create an exception thereto,
such that the "natural distaste" for the result reached in Guidry
no longer remains. 84 Toward that end, a review of the nonfiduci-
ary-employee wrongdoing case law is necessary.
The nonfiduciary-employee wrongdoing cases can be gener-
ally categorized into three types. In a Type 1 case, the employer is
the named ERISA trustee and seeks to withhold more than the
amount the employee is convicted of stealing. In a Type 2 case,
the employer is the named ERISA trustee and seeks to withhold
an amount equal to or less than the amount the employee-wrong-
doer is convicted of stealing. In a Type 3 case, the named ERISA
trustee is someone other than the employer and either the em-
79 Guidry, 493 U.S. at 376-77 (emphasis added).
80 Herberger v. Shanbaum, 897 F.2d 801, 804 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 817
(1990).
81 Coar v. Kazimir, 990 F.2d 1413, 1419 (3rd Cir. 1993).
82 Id. at 1423.
83 Id. at 1420-21.
84 It appears that absent the congressional intervention called for in this Note to
enact a criminal fraud amendment, the Supreme Court will inevitably resolve the
split among the circuits in the fiduciary wrongdoing area as it did in Guidry in the
nonfiduciary employee wrongdoing area: by speculating on congressional intent.
[Vol. 68:667
CRIMINAL FRAUD AMENDMENT
ployer, or a subrogee to a right of the employer, seeks to attach the
pension benefits of the defalcating employee, after entry of a crim-
inal conviction. These distinctions are significant because, in the
first two scenarios, courts should find that both the nonforfeiture
and the anti-alienation provisions impede restitution whereas, in
the third, only the anti-alienation rule is applicable because the
employer is not the party actually holding the pension benefits
and, thus, cannot effect a forfeiture of those funds.
A Employee Wrongdoing Cases That Preceded Guidry
One of the first employee wrongdoing cases was Helmsley-
Spear, Inc. v. Winter,8 5 wherein an employer accused its employee
of engaging in a wide range of fraudulent activities, including fal-
sification of invoices, misappropriation of checks, and the accept-
ance of kickbacks from the employer's suppliers at an alleged cost
to the employer of $665,549.86 Ultimately, the employee was con-
victed of grand larceny for the theft of two checks totalling
$8584.87 The employer, however, sought and obtained the attach-
ment of all $20,924.94 in the employee's ERISA-qualified profit
sharing plan, a Type 1 scenario.88 Averring that ERISA's anti-
alienation rule precludes involuntary assignments, the state ap-
pellate court vacated the trial court's grant of attachment 9 and,
largely employing a nonforfeiture argument, declined to create an
exception for employee fraud.90 A thorough dissent challenged the
majority with the declaration that ERISA's nonforfeiture rules
should not be construed "to shield an employee, proven to be a




89 Id. at 781. In upholding its earlier ruling refusing to vacate the order of
attatchment of the pension benefits, the trial court reasoned that "[ilf a spendthrift
trust is available to satisfy a tort claim, it would be a fortiori inequitable to allow one
who has been convicted of stealing from his employer to invoke such a provision to
escape his obligations to make whole the employer who has suffered the depreda-
tions." Helmsley-Spear, Inc. v. Winter, 420 N.Y.S.2d 599, 601 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County
1979), modified, 426 N.Y.S.2d 778 (App. Div. 1980), aff'd, 419 N.E.2d 1078 (N.Y.
1981) (mem.). The modification was, of course, the vacating of the order of attach-
ment. Helmsley-Spear, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 781.
90 Id. In declining to create an exception, the Appellate Division, First Depart-
ment, noted the "'strong public policy against forfeiture of employee benefits mani-
fested by... [ERISAI.'" Id. (quoting Post v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc., 397 N.E.2d 358, 360 (N.Y. 1979)); see supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text
(distinguishing forfeiture from alienation).
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thief, from the reach of remedies designed for the enforcement of
judgments."91 Thus began the debate over whether to create an
exception for an employee's criminal fraud.
In Vink v. SHV North American Holding Corp.,92 another
Type 1 case, an employee pleaded guilty to accepting a $25,000
bribe from his employer's suppliers and was convicted of mail
fraud. 93 The employer further alleged that Vink had diverted
more than three million dollars in business from the employer by
setting up dummy corporations with his wife as the sole share-
holder.94 In compelling the employer to distribute to Vink the
pension benefits owed to him, the court relied on a nonforfeiture
rationale and deemed the employer's refusal to pay as invoking an
implied "bad boy" clause,95 which vests in the employer the discre-
tion to decide when an employee's alleged misconduct should re-
sult in pension forfeiture. The court advanced four reasons for its
refusal to create an implied exception for criminal fraud. First,
Congress clearly intended to foreclose the use of "bad boy"
clauses.96 Second, although recognition of the family support ex-
ception to ERISA's nonforfeiture and anti-alienation provisions
promotes the well-being of dependents, the creation of a fraud ex-
ception would harm the dependents of faithless employees. 97
Third, the DOL favored an interpretation of ERISA that allows
employees to keep pension benefits despite having received illegal
bribes.98 Fourth, whereas ample precedent existed for creating a
91 Helmsley-Spear, 426 N.Y.S. 2d at 784 (Fein, J.P., dissenting). The dissent ar-
gued that the issue was not whether an exception to alienation should be allowed for
tort creditors, but rather whether a "faithless employee" may rely on the anti-aliena-
tion provision against the employer from whom he has stolen. Id. at 782. Judge Fein
scathingly added that "[tihe statute was not designed to aid thieves in retaining their
loot." Id. at 783.
92 549 F. Supp. 268 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
93 Id. at 269. The employee was also convicted of falsely representing his em-
ployer's approval as guarantor of a $95,000 personal loan. Id.
94 Id.
95 Id. at 270; see supra note 30-32 (discussing "bad boy" clauses).
96 Vink, 549 F. Supp. at 270-71; see supra notes 30-32 (discussing "bad boy"
clauses).
97 Vink, 549 F. Supp. at 271. The court went on to mention that carving out a
fraud exception could increase "the number of public charges." Id.
98 Id. at 271-72. The Vink court's assertion with respect to the DOL's position
was based on the Eighth Circuit's decision in Winer v. Edison Bros. Stores Pension
Plan, 593 F.2d 307 (8th Cir. 1979).
In Winer, an employer believed that two former employees received illegal kick-
backs from suppliers. Id. at 309. On the basis of this discretionary belief, and prior to
the entry of any criminal convictions, id. at 309 n.2, the employer invoked the provi-
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family support exception, none existed for creating a fraud
exception.99
Although noting that the facts of the case presented a perfect
opportunity "to carve out a 'fraud' exception to ERISA's
nonforfeitability provisions,"100 and "that Vink's fraudulent ac-
tions will subtract from the amounts that... [the employer's]
faithful employees will receive under the company's profit-sharing
pension plan,"1' 1 the Vink court advanced an argument that
would become the hallmark for subsequent appellate court refus-
als to create a criminal fraud exception to ERISA's anti-alienation
rule:' 0 2 it would be judicially impracticable to administer. 03
sions of a "bad boy" clause to effectuate a forfeiture of the employee's pension benefits.
Id. at 309. The Secretary of Labor filed suit against the plan, alleging breaches of
ERISA's vesting requirements, id. at 310, and the Winer court affirmed the trial
court's determination that the employees were entitled to their pension benefits.
Winer, 593 F.2d at 310.
There is a distinction between Winer and Vink which the Vink court conveniently
overlooked. In Winer, the employer's decision to withhold the pension benefits was
based on its own discretionary finding that the employees had received illegal kick-
backs whereas in Vink there was a criminal conviction entered in a competent state
court as to the employee's receipt of the illegal kickback. With respect to "bad boy"
clauses, Congress sought to remedy potential overreaching and the undue influence
an employer could exert over an allegedly disloyal employee. See H.R. REP. No. 807,
93d Cong., 2d Sess. 60 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4726 ("[A] vested
benefit is not to be forfeited because the employee later went to work for a competitor,
or in some other way was considered 'disloyal' to the employer.") (emphasis added); see
also supra note 32 (citing further legislative history relating to "bad boy" clauses).
Thus, the Vink coures statement that "the Department of Labor sued... [in
Winer] so as to prohibit companies from denying pension benefits to employees dis-
missed because they received illegal kickbacks from suppliers," Vink, 549 F. Supp. at
271-72, was gratuitously broad, misleading, and not necessarily applicable where an
employee has been convicted of criminal wrongdoing. See infra note 210 (discussing
DOL's position). Subsequent appellate courts that refused to create a criminal fraud
exception failed to address this crucial distinction and relied on Vink notwithstanding
the decision's inapplicability in situations in which there has been a criminal adjudi-
cation that an employee has looted his employer.
99 Vink, 549 F. Supp. at 272. In Vink, the employer cited one case in support of its
position: National Bank v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers Local 3, 419 N.Y.S.2d
127 (App. Div.), appeal dismissed, 397 N.E.2d 1333 (N.Y. 1979). Vink, 549 F. Supp. at
272. The Vink court noted, however, that the case was disapproved by the Appellate
Division, First Department, in the Helmsley.Spear decision, which was later affirmed
by the New York State Court of Appeals. Id.; see Helmsley-Spear, Inc. v. Winter, 426
N.Y.S.2d 778, 780 (App. Div. 1980), aff'd, 419 N.E.2d 1078 (N.Y. 1981).
100 Vink, 549 F. Supp. at 273.
101 Id.
102 See Ellis Nat'l Bank v. Irving Trust Co., 786 F.2d 466, 471-72 (2d Cir. 1986)
(citing Vink's reasoning as authority not to create "criminal misconduct" exception);
United Metal Products v. Natl Bank, 811 F.2d 297, 299, 300 (6th Cir. 1987) (same).
The United Metal court also noted an additional factor in deciding not to create the
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The first appellate court to recognize an implied exception for
criminal fraud was the Eleventh Circuit in St. Paul Fire & Marine
Insurance Co. v. Cox, 10 4 a Type 3 case. In Cox, the president of an
Alabama bank was convicted of willful misapplication of bank
funds. The district court permitted the bank's insurer to garnish
the president's pension benefits pursuant to a right of subroga-
tion.10 5 The Eleventh Circuit noted that some courts interpreted
ERISA as overriding "bad boy" clauses (and criminal fraud excep-
tions by analogy),1 °6 but nonetheless affirmed the district court's
determination by employing the equitable doctrine that a wrong-
doer should not benefit from his own crime.10 7 The court declared
exception: namely, that such a decision is for the legislature to make, not the judici-
ary. Id. (citing United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 559 (1979). But see United
Metal, 811 F.2d at 301 (Wellford, C.J., dissenting) (refuting Vink court's arguments
and reasoning); infra part VI.B. (same).
103 Vink, 549 F. Supp. at 273. The Vink court reasoned that:
Congress has spoken, and the statute makes clear that the pension benefits
of both faithless employees like Vink and faithful ones are to be protected,
even if it means that the faithful employees will suffer at the expense of the
faithless ones.
Carving out an exception in this case would start a boundless stream of
suits and disputes in which companies refuse to pay pension benefits to al-
legedly disloyal employees. Courts would then have to determine whether a
fraud exception should apply only to felonies, or whether it should apply to
misdemeanors and acts of negligence as well.
Regulation is an imprecise science. Decisions about who and what
should be regulated are for Congress to make, so long as such regulations do
not offend the Constitution. If SHV would like to create a fraud exception to
ERISA's nonforfeitability provisions, it should address its arguments to Con-
gress, not to this court.
Id.
104 752 F.2d 550 (11th Cir. 1985) (per curiam).
105 Id. at 551. In contrast to Vink and Helmsley-Spear, the focus of Cox centered
on the anti-alienation provision rather than the nonforfeiture rules. Id. at 551 n-1.
Unlike Vink and Helmsley-Spear, Cox involved a subrogee of an employer that sought
to attach the employee's pension benefits. Thus, any surrender of the employee's pen-
sion rights is not properly classified as a forfeiture, but rather, as an alienation.
Therefore, only the anti-alienation rule is applicable. Id. at 552 n.1; see supra notes
18-20 (distinguishing forfeiture from alienation).
106 Cox, 752 F.2d at 552 n.2. "Cox's offense was not simply an act of disloyalty
[which is the purported justification for "bad boy" forfeitures]; it was a felony perpe-
trated against his employer. The insulation of an employee from liability for the con-
sequences of his criminal misconduct does not ... [promote ERISA's goals]." Id. at
552 (footnote omitted).
107 Id. The court found that ERISA "provides no indication whatsoever that it...
[is] intended to protect the employee against the consequences of his own misdeeds."
Id. at 552. On the contrary, allowing garnishment in this case best promotes the fun-
damental ERISA aims of "financial stability of the employer and, indirectly, the em-
ployers pension plan." Id. The court further concluded that ERISA's preemption pro-
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that "Congress did not intend the anti-alienation provision of
ERISA to create a windfall for employees who engage in criminal
acts at the expense of their employers."1 0 8
Perhaps the most egregious employee-wrongdoer case is Ellis
National Bank v. Irving Trust Co.,10 9 a Type 3 case, wherein the
very benefits receiving anti-alienation protection were fraudu-
lently earned pension contributions."10 The Ellis court disagreed
with the Eleventh Circuit's finding in Cox and allowed ERISA's
anti-alienation rule to shield fraudulent commissions earned by a
stockbroker from the reach of the defrauded employer. Contrary
to Cox, the Ellis court believed that even a narrow criminal fraud
exception would undermine rather than promote the stability of
pension plans "by creating uncertainty and potentially delayed re-
ceipt or non-receipt of promised benefits.""'
In Ellis, Sam Kalil, Jr., an employee of Bache & Company,
participated in the employer's retirement plan and had amassed a
vested interest of approximately $170,000.112 In 1984, a Florida
bank obtained state court judgments against Kalil totaling
$210,430.46, which he satisfied by revocably assigning to the bank
his interest in the plan."z3 The bank, as assignee, sued the trustee
of the plan, Irving Trust & Co.," x4 for disbursement, but the
trustee answered with an interpleader counterclaim against Kalil,
vision does not preclude application of the equitable doctrine that a person should not
profit from his own crime, Cox, 752 F.2d at 552 n.3, because "most courts have con-
cluded that Congress intended to preempt only those state laws relating directly to
employee benefit plans." Id.; see, e.g., American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Merry, 592 F.2d
118, 121 (2d Cir. 1979) (indicating that state laws concerning availability of garnish-
ment orders are not preempted); Stone v. Stone, 450 F. Supp. 919 (N.D. Cal. 1978)
(same), aff'd, 632 F.2d 740 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 922 (1981).
108 Cox, 752 F.2d at 551.
109 786 F.2d 466 (2d Cir. 1986).
110 Id. at 467.
111 Ellis, 786 F.2d at 471. The court reiterated the "endless stream of litigation"
argument raised in Vink:
Would the exception be available to only employers or pension plans, or also
to third parties allegedly victimized, such as creditors, the government or
even other employees? Would the exception withstand a charge that it
would favor business tort claimants over creditors? Would it pave the way




114 It should be emphasized that the pension plan trustee was Irving Trust & Co.,
and not the employer, Bache & Co. Id. at 467. Thus, the Ellis case concerned only
ERISA's anti-alienation provision and not its nonforfeiture rules. See Ellis, 786 F.2d
at 470 n.4 (recognizing distinction). Unlike the Vink and Helmsley-Spear cases, the
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the bank, and Bache." 5 Kalil demanded that the trustee disburse
the proceeds to the bank, and the bank asserted its rights to the
funds as assignee; Bache, however, alleged that Kalil had con-
verted the funds of its customers, "which funds were subsequently
deposited into the Plan[ ]."116 Bache further alleged that it had
paid more than three million dollars to customers who had sus-
tained losses due to Kalil's actions and that, therefore, it was sub-
rogated to the claims of its customers.- 7
In early 1985, Kalil pleaded nolo contendere to eight counts of
grand theft and securities fraud in connection with the defrauding
of Bache customers and was sentenced to twenty-six months in
prison and ten years probation.:'" The bank ultimately prevailed,
however, as the district court granted its motion for summary
judgment."19
Significantly, unlike in the other employee wrongdoing cases,
the very property stolen from the employer in Ellis-the fraudu-
lent commissions-was contributed to the pension plan and was
protected by ERISA's anti-alienation rule.' 20 What message does
the Ellis decision send to embezzlers, defalcators, and other
criminals? It appears to be this: If you plan to steal from your
employer, deposit as much of the funds as possible into your
ERISA qualified pension plan, as Sam Kalil did in Ellis. This
money will be safeguarded if your employer discovers the act, even
if you are criminally prosecuted and ordered to return the funds,
as Congress has provided protection in ERISA's anti-alienation
rule. In addition, and even more shocking, the Ellis court has un-
wittingly proclaimed that even pension contributions derived from
stolen funds will receive alienation protection.
By the Sixth Circuit's own admission, "an almost ideal case
for the creation of an implied exception to pension anti-alienation
laws" "'- was presented in United Metal Products Corp. v. National
Bank. 22 Yet the Sixth Circuit declined its own invitation to cre-
Ellis court's refusal to grant the constructive trust remedy was based on ERISA's
anti-alienation rule and not its nonforfeiture provisions. Id. at 467.
115 Id. at 467.
116 Id. at 467-68.
117 Id. at 468.
118 Ellis, 786 F.2d at 467.
119 Id. at 468.
120 See id., at 468 ("[The employer] had directly deposited all of these [fraudulent
commissions] into the Plans for. .. [the employee's] benefit.").
121 United Metal Products Corp. v. Natl Bank, 811 F.2d 297, 300 (6th Cir. 1987).
122 811 F.2d 297 (6th Cir. 1987).
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ate a criminal fraud exception, adopting instead the reasoning of
the Vink and Ellis courts. 23
In United Metal, an employee embezzled more than $440,000
from her employer, which maintained a profit-sharing plan
for the benefit of its employees."2 The embezzler had no
dependents 125 and subsequently fled the country126 leaving be-
hind some $35,000 in her pension plan account. 127 Despite the
fact that the employer sought "access to ... [the embezzler's pen-
sion benefits] ... to return them to the [profit-sharing] plan for
use by its loyal employees injured by... [the embezzler's] wrong-
doing[,]" 12 that the embezzler had no dependents to support, and
that the embezzler had fled the country and would likely never
return, the Sixth Circuit, over a strong dissent,
129
refused to impose a constructive trust on the embezzler's
benefits. 30
13 See id. at 300 ("We find the reasoning and authority of the Second Circuit [in
Ellis] persuasive."); id. at 299 (citing Vink approvingly).
124 Id. at 298.
125 Id. at 300.
126 United Metal, 811 F.2d at 298 n.l.
127 Id. at 298.
128 Id. at 300.
129 See id. at 300-01 (Wellford, C.J., dissenting). Chief Judge Wellford offered
four reasons why, in his view, a criminal fraud exception should be created. First,
insulating the interest of a criminal who has embezzled over $440,000 from her em-
ployer does not protect fellow employees who are participants in the profit-sharing
plan or promote security in the workplace-the principal goals of ERISA. Id. at 301.
In fact, it is "readily infer[able] that the wrongful taking of substantial funds had an
adverse effect on the profits of United Metal Products and, consequently on other em-
ployees under the plan." United Metal, 811 F.2d at 301. Second, legislative concern
over "bad boy" clauses "is no basis to attribute to Congress an intent to protect a
fraudulent employee, especially one found after court proceedings to have engaged in
conduct criminal in nature and ini m cal, not only to the employer, but to fellow em-
ployees whom ERISA is designed to protect." Id. Third, the trepidation over the view
that a narrow criminal fraud exception "limited to... outrageous and undisputed
criminal... misconduct. would force pension plan trustees to engage in limitless
litigation is unfounded. Id. Finally, the reasons behind creating a family support
exception to ERISA's anti-alienation rule were no more compelling than the reasons
for creating a criminal fraud exception. Id.; see infra notes 258-265 (discussing this
contention).
130 The United Metal court, in addition to adopting the Ellis and Vink reasoning,
offered an additional reason for not creating a criminal fraud exception; namely, if an
exception is to be created, it is for Congress to decide. United Metal, 811 F.2d at 300.
The court explained:
Only when a literal construction of a statute yields results so manifestly un-
reasonable that they could not fairly be attributed to congressional design
will an exception to statutory language be judicially implied .... We believe
Congress could have reasonably concluded that stability and certainty of
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B. The Guidry Decision''
Curtis Guidry was a high-ranking union official and trustee of
one of the local union pension funds who, by virtue of his position,
was eligible to collect pension benefits from three separate union
plans.13 2 After an audit, it was determined that approximately
one million dollars was missing from the union's coffers. Guidry
subsequently pleaded guilty to embezzling over $377,000 from the
union, in violation of fiduciary duties contained in LMRDA. 133
Although Guidry served as trustee of one of the union pension
funds, there was never any showing of a breach of fiduciary duty
under ERISA,134 apparently because that pension fund had nego-
tiated a settlement with Guidry.13 5 While incarcerated, Guidry
filed a complaint alleging that the pension plans had failed to pay
him his rightful pension entitlement. 136 The union intervened
and asserted six claims against Guidry. The union agreed to set-
tle the first five claims for a $275,000 judgment in its favor. The
sixth claim, through which the union sought the imposition of a
constructive trust on Guidry's pension benefits, remained in dis-
pute and, therefore, was litigated by the parties.1 37
pension and profit sharing plans, as well as the avoidance of delay or non-
receipt of promised benefits, are important and legitimate goals of ERISA.
Id. (citation omitted).
131 For other pre-Guidry employee wrongdoing cases not discussed herein, see
National Bank of N. Am. v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers Local 3, Pension &
Vacation Funds, 419 N.Y.S.2d 127 (App. Div.), appeal dismissed, 397 N.E.2d 1333
(N.Y. 1979); Kann v. Keystone, 575 F. Supp. 1084 (W.D. Pa. 1983); Calhoun v. FDIC,
653 F. Supp. 1288 (N.D. Tex. 1987).
132 Guidry, 493 U.S. at 367. Guidry was the chief executive officer of Sheet Metal
International Association from 1964 to 1981 and the trustee of Sheet Metal Workers
Local 9 from 1977 to 1981. Id.
133 Id. One of the methods Guidry employed in his embezzlement scheme was
stealing checks issued by the pension plans to the union as payment for clerical serv-
ices. Id. at 374 n.14.
134 Id. at 373. Guidry was convicted of stealing money from the union only, and
not directly from the pension plan. Guidry, 493 U.S. at 373.
135 Id. at 368 n.6. The Local No. 9 pension fund for which Guidry served as
trustee received $20,000 of Guidry's accrued benefit from that pension plan only,
which was to be paid to the pension fund's insurer. Id.
136 Id. at 368.
137 Id. The Supreme Court explained:
The District Court, therefore, was confronted with three different views re-
garding the disbursement of... [Guidry's] pension benefits. [Guidry) ...
contended that the benefits should be paid to him. The two [pension] funds
argued that the benefits had been forfeited. The Union asserted that the
benefits had not been forfeited, but that a constructive trust should be im-
CRIMINAL FRAUD AMENDMENT
The United States District Court for the District of Colorado
did not believe it was bound by prior employee wrongdoing case
law and imposed a constructive trust based on Guidry's breaches
of several provisions of the LMRDA. 13' The Tenth Circuit af-
firmed on different grounds, 13 9 relying on ERISA's remedial pro-
visions for trustee breach and principles of trust law.
140
As discussed earlier in this Note,'41 the Supreme Court disal-
lowed the imposition of a constructive trust on Guidry's pension
benefits. The Court rejected the idea for two reasons. First, the
court stated that the court of appeals erred in invoking ERISA's
fiduciary breach remedial provisions because a breach of fiduciary
duty under the LMRDA is not proof of a breach of fiduciary duty to
the pension plans under ERISA. 142 Thus, the question of whether
posed so that the benefits would be paid to the Union rather than to...
[Guidry].
Guidry, 493 U.S. at 369.
138 Guidry v. Sheet Metal Worker's Natl Pension Fund, 641 F. Supp. 360, 362-63
(D. Colo. 1986), aff'd, 856 F.2d 1457 (10th Cir. 1988), rev'd, 493 U.S. 365 (1990). The
court first rejected the defendant's forfeiture argument, explaining that even in cases
in which misconduct has occured, ERISA's anti-forfeiture provision requires payment
of vested benefits as a matter of law. Id. at 361-62. The court next considered whether
a constructive trust in favor of the union would be contrary to congressional intent.
Id. at 362-63. The district court did not deem either Ellis or Cox as controlling be-
cause neither case involved a breach of fiduciary duty under the LMDRA, and both
cases were therefore distinguishable. Id. at 362. Instead, by reading ERISA in pari
materia with the LAIMA, the district court found that, in light of the evils these
statutes were created to cure, the breach of fiduciary duty under the LMRDA was
sufficient to merit a narrow exception to ERISA's anti-alienation provision. Id. The
court, therefore, imposed a constructive trust on Guidry's pension benefits until the
judgment was satisfied. Guidry, 641 F. Supp. at 363.
139 Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers' Nat'l Pension Fund, 856 F.2d 1457 (10th Cir.
1988), rev'd, 493 U.S. 365 (1990).
140 Id. at 1460-61; see also supra note 71 (discussing ERISA's remedial provisions
for trustee breaches of fiduciary duties and trust law principles).
141 See supra notes 12-15 and accompanying text; supra note 78 (discussing Gui-
dry's relation to wrongdoing fiduciaries).
142 Guidry, 493 U.S. at 373-74. The Supreme Court placed much emphasis on the
fact that the union and not the pension plan itself was apparently stuck with the
losses caused by Guidry's embezzlement. Id. at 373, 374 n.14. "It is clear, however,
that... [Guidry] was convicted of stealing money only from the Union," id. at 373,
and the Union "cannot avoid the fact that the [pension] funds here and the Union are
distinct legal entities." Id. The Court did recognize, however, that Guidry's "actions
may have harmed the Union's members who are the beneficiaries of the [pension]
funds." Id. at 373-74.
Because the Union also perceived the potential problem created by the lack of a
breach to the pension plans themselves, it, like the district court, relied principally on
LMEDA's remedial provisions in its argument before the Supreme Court. Guidry,
493 U.S. at 374. The Union asserted that the LMRDA's remedial provisions allow the
imposition of a constructive trust and because it is a federal statute, ERISA cannot
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a breach of ERISA fiduciary duties can result in an exception to
the anti-alienation rule for attempts to attach a faithless fiduci-
ary's pension benefits remains unanswered. 143 Second, the Court
held that, except perhaps for trustee faithlessness, which the
Supreme Court did not consider in Guidry, there should be no
"generalized equitable exception-either for employee malfea-
sance or for criminal misconduct-to ERISA's" anti-alienation
rule.14 4
C. Guidry's Progeny
Although Guidry's bar on equitable exceptions to ERISA's
anti-alienation rule has had a pronounced effect outside the area
of employee wrongdoing,145 only three employee wrongdoing cases
"be construed to alter, amend, modify, invalidate, impair or supersede" it. Id. at 375
(quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1144(d)). The Supreme Court quickly foreclosed the use of this
federal law supremacy argument: "Were we to accept... [the Union's] position, ER-
ISA's anti-alienation provision would be inapplicable whenever a judgment creditor
relied on the remedial provisions of a federal statute .... [W]e decline to adopt so
broad a reading of... [29 U.S.C. § 1144(d)]." Id. at 375. The Court did not believe
that Congress intended that the general authorization of the imposition of a construc-
tive trust by the LMRDA to override the specific prohibition in ERISA on assignment
or alienation. Id. Instead, the court reconciled the two statutes "by holding that the
LMRDA determines what sort ofjudgment the aggrieved party may obtain, while ER-
ISA governs the narrow question whether that judgment may be collected through a
particular means." Id. at 376 (emphasis in original); see also supra note 8 (discussing
this aspect of Supreme Court's decision).
143 See Guidry, 493 U.S. at 373 ("We need not decide whether the remedial provi-
sions contained in... [29 U.S.C. § 1109(a)] supersede the bar on alienation in... [29
U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1)]."); see also supra part H.D.2. (discussing this open question).
144 Guidry, 493 U.S. at 376. The Court viewed § 206 (d) of ERISA (the anti-alien-
ation provision) as a "considered congressional policy choice" to safeguard pension
plan participants and their defendants, and indicated that if an exception is to be
created it should be done by Congress. Id.
145 See, e.g., Mills v. Mills, 790 F. Supp. 172 (S.D. Ohio 1992). In Mills, the daugh-
ter of an ERISA pension plan participant was awarded a $2,000,000 state court judg-
ment against her father for years of "appalling... physical and sexual abuse." Id. at
177. Aware of the Supreme Court's pronouncement that there are no equitable excep-
tions to ERISA's anti-alienation rule, the plaintiff attempted to argue that the judg-
ment was a "qualified domestic relations order" (QDRO) which can attach an ERISA
pension plan because, pursuant to REA, a QDRO is not preempted by ERISA and is
an exception to the anti-alienation rule. Id. at 174; see supra note 42 and accompany-
ing text (explaining QDROs). This argument failed because the judgment clearly did
not fall within the definition of a QDRO, and the court granted summary judgment
against the daughter. Mills, 790 F. Supp. at 176-77. In recognition of its inability to
create an equitable exception because of Guidry, the court acknowledged the "natural
distaste" for "ERISA's harsh effect in this matter." Id.
It is worthwhile to note the tragic irony in this decision. The Guidry Court de-
clared that the protection of pension benefits via ERISA's anti-alienation rule is sup-
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have arisen since Guidry."6 Thus, it would seem the decision has
posed to be for the participant and his dependents. Guidry, 493 U.S. at 376. Here, the
anti-alienation provision has the opposite effect and precludes such a dependent from
that protection. Mills, 790 F. Supp. at 177-78.
Furthermore, Mills illustrates a broader principle underlying the inequity in the
employee wrongdoing cases. One of the reasons proffered against creating a wrong-
doer exception is that the wrongdoer may have blameless dependents to support. Gui-
dry, 490 U.S. at 376. Yet, is it more likely that a wrongdoer will use her pension
benefits to support her blameless dependents? Or is it more likely that her propensity
for dishonesty will defeat the moral obligation to those dependents? The Mills court
apparently recognized this contradiction. Editing a quote from Guidry, the Mills court
explained that the anti-alienation rule "reflects a considered congressional policy
choice... to safeguard a stream of income for pensioners... even if that decision
prevents others from securing relief for the wrongs done them.'" Mills, 790 F. Supp.
at 175 (quoting Guidry, 493 U.S. at 376). With the second ellipsis the court deleted
the phrase "and their dependents, who may be, and perhaps usually are, blameless."
Guidry, 493 U.S. at 376. Could there be a more blameless candidate for dependency
protection under ERISA's anti-alienation rule than a daughter who has suffered years
of physical and sexual abuse at the hands of her ERISA-participant father?
146 In re Bell & Beckwith, 5 F.3d 150 (6th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1060
(1994); United States v. Gaudet, 966 F.2d 959 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct.
1294 (1993); Pomeranke v. Williamson, 478 N.W.2d 800 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991).
In Pomeranke, Williamson pled guilty to embezzlement of bank trust funds for
which he received a 41 month prison sentence and was ordered to pay restitution of
$280,000 to one of the defrauded trust beneficiaries. Pomeranke, 478 N.W.2d at 801.
While incarcerated, Williamson requested a $14,000 distribution from his $56,000
ERISA-qualified profit-sharing plan, which he had not included in a list of non-ex-
empt assets required by the restitution order. Id. The district court granted the de-
frauded beneficiary's motion for an order directing the release of the $14,000 and
eventually the balance of the profit-sharing account for distribution to the defrauded
beneficiary as payment of the restitution order. Id. "In light of the unequivocal direc-
tive in Guidry," id. at 802, the Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed the district court
and ordered that the funds be distributed to Williamson, the plan beneficiary. Id.
Two things should be noted regarding the Pomeranke case. First, it was decided
prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Patterson v. Shumate, 509 U.S. 753 (1992),
which held that under the anti-alienation rule a debtor in bankruptcy may exclude
his interest in an ERISA-qualified pension from his bankruptcy estate. See supra
note 46 and accompanying text. Williamson had not filed bankruptcy. Yet, had this
case arisen after Patterson, all Williamson would had to have done to shield his ER-
ISA benefits from the defrauded beneficiary is to so file. Second, Pomeranke is not a
true employee wrongdoing case because the estates whose funds had been embezzled,
and not the employer bank, obtained the restitution order. The reason why the benefi-
ciary did not seek compensation from Williamson's employer, and then have William-
son's employer seek reimbursement from Williamson, is unknown.
In Gaudet, the facts bear a striking resemblance to those of Guidry. Stanley
Gaudet served as president of a local sheet metal workers' union and as trustee of
several of its ERISA qualified pension funds. Gaudet, 966 F.2d at 961. He pled guilty
to 22 counts of embezzlement totaling $2,710,538.87 from the pension plan and
$40,000 from the union, in violation of only the LMRDA. Id. As in Guidry, there was
apparently no showing that Gaudet breached any fiduciary duties owed to the pension
plans themselves. The district court, disregarding the Supreme Court's unequivocal
directive in Guidry, "ordered Gaudet to relinquish the pension funds to which he...
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deterred employers, who might otherwise have sought redress for
an employee's criminal wrongdoing, from attacking plan benefits
vested under ERISA. The Supreme Court, however, may not be
finished with the Curtis Guidry saga as "[t]he parties to this bitter
and interminable litigation have locked horns yet again."14 7
In November 1993, after Guidry's retirement benefits had
been paid out of the pension plan,141 the Tenth Circuit held that
[was] personally entitled." Id. Naturally, Gaudet argued that Guidry required a re-
versal of the district court's decision. Id. at 963. The Fifth Circuit ruled that because
Gaudet failed to object to the inclusion of his ERISA benefits in the district court's
Presentence Report, which listed assets available for restitution, it was restricted to
reviewing his Guidry argument only for plain error. Id. The Fifth Circuit concluded
that the district court's oversight of the Guidry mandate is "not an obvious one."
Gaudet, 966 F.2d at 963. The Fifth Circuit explained that "[nlo judge or other legal
scholar can be expected to have an intimate knowledge of every obscure rule of law."
Id. at 964. The judge, therefore, was not expected to have knowledge of a landmark
Supreme Court decision in the area of ERISA benefits law decided just 18 months
earlier. While it is obvious that the Fifth Circuit yielded to its judicial instinct to do
equity among the parties, it is suggested that its decision, that the district court's
oversight of Guidry was not plain error, is manifestly ridiculous. It is, however, indic-
ative of the judicial integrity that is compromised when the terms of a statute such as
ERISA are construed to compel so unreasonable a result as allowing an embezzler to
keep stolen property while his victim goes uncompensated.
In Bell & Beckwith, the managing general partner of a stock brokerage limited
partnership had embezzled approximately $47,000,000. Bell & Beckwith, 5 F.3d at
151. The limited partnership maintained a profit-sharing plan, to which contribu-
tions could be made only from the partnership's net income. Id. at 151, 153. The
partnership's trustee in bankruptcy obtained deficiency judgments against the embez-
zler and a writ of execution against his individual interest in the profit-sharing plan.
Id. at 152. The bankruptcy court held that the anti-alienation rule shields the embez-
zler's pension benefits. Id. at 152. The district court reversed, holding that the
trustee should be given a chance to prove his argument that some of the contributions
violated the plan's "net income rule" and were therefore void ab initio. Id. at 151-52.
The Sixth Circuit affirmed, distinguishing Guidry and Patterson:
In neither Guidry nor Patterson was the propriety of pension contributions
at issue. Here ... the district court, rather than carving out an equitable
exception to ERISA, simply said that any contributions made on behalf of...
[the embezzler] in violation of the net income requirement of the plan would
be void ab initio. Since void, they never became a part of the plan, and so
were not being alienated within the contemplation of the ERISA prohibition
.... * [Therefore... the policy concerns of Guidry and Patterson are not
implicated ....
Bell & Beckwith, 5 F.3d at 153.
It seems a void ab initio argument could have been successfully made in the Ellis
case, see supra part HI.A., wherein fraudulently earned commissions received anti-
alienation protection. Such an argument, however, was not presented in that case.
147 Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n, Local No. 9, 10 F.3d 700 (10th Cir.
1993), modified, 39 F.3d 1078 (10th Cir. 1994) (en banc); see supra note 143.
148 See supra note 142. After the pension funds began making monthly payments
into a bank account established by Guidry for that purpose, Local 9 sought to collect
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the anti-alienation rule no longer protected those benefits, and
that they could be garnished by the union.' 49 The court noted that
"it is impossible to glean from the statute whether Congress in-
tended the anti-alienation provision to protect benefits paid and
received"15 0 as does, for instance, the Social Security Act.' 51 The
its unpaid judgment against Guidry. Guidry - Local No. 9, 10 F.3d at 704. Under an
agreement, an agent of the pension funds would make out a deposit slip for payment
of Guidry's monthly pension, and then the union would seek to garnish the funds as
soon as they arrived in that account. Id.
149 Id. at 716. In contrast, the district court held that the prohibition against
garnishment applies to pension proceeds paid and received "so long as the proceeds
are clearly identified as such and have not been commingled with other funds or used
for the acquisition of assets." Id. at 704. The district court's conclusion was based on
the "law of the case" doctrine which requires each court to follow the directions of
courts that are higher in the judicial hierarchy-in this instance, the Supreme Court
in Guidry. Id. at 704; see generally 18 CHARLEs A. WRIGRT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE 4478 (1993 & Supp. 1994) (discussing "law of the case" doctrine).
On appeal to the Tenth Circuit, Guidry relied not only on the "law of the case"
doctrine, but also argued that ERISA's anti-alienation rule precludes garnishment of
benefits paid and received. Guidry, 10 F.2d at 705. The Tenth Circuit rejected both of
Guidry's arguments notwithstanding the Guidry Court's pronouncement that ER-
ISA's anti-alienation provision "reflects a considered congressional policy choice, a de-
cision to safeguard a stream of income for pensioners...." Guidry, 493 U.S. at 376
(emphasis added). After dismissing the "law of the case" argument, Guidry, 10 F.3d
at 705-08, the Tenth Circuit determined that the text of the anti-alienation rule was
unclear on the issue and, therefore, could not be controlling. Id. at 708.
150 Id. at 708. The Tenth Circuit concluded that the anti-alienation rule does not
apply to benefits paid and received. Id. at 710. Rather, the Tenth Circuit intimated
that, since the statute is unclear on whether Congress intended ERISA to apply to
benefits paid and received on only monies being currently held in a pension plan, it
had to defer to applicable ERISA regulations which indicate that the anti-alienation
provision protects benefits while they remain in the plan, but not after they are paid
out. Id. at 716.
The Tenth Circuit's conclusion turned on certain Treasury Regulations and an
interpretation of the term "benefits" in the anti-alienation provision. Recall that the
anti-alienation rule requires that "[e]ach pension plan.., provide that benefits pro-
vided under the plan ... not be assigned or alienated." 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1) (foot-
note 5 is full cite) (emphasis added). The issue, therefore, was whether "benefits pro-
vided under the plan" means:
[Tihe right to future payment or the actual money paid by the plan and re-
ceived by the beneficiary. If... [it] means the right to future payments, then
the garnishment of money paid out to Mr. Guidry would... be [proper]. If,
however.... [it] means the actual money paid to Mr. Guidry, then... [gar-
nishment would not be proper].
Guidry - Local No. 9, 10 F.3d at 708.
The court concluded that the statute was unclear and looked to the Treasury Reg-
ulations for guidance. Id. at 708-10. The regulations define "assignment" and "aliena-
tion" as "any ... arrangement... whereby a party acquires from a participant or
beneficiary a right or interest enforceable against the plan..." Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)-
13(c)(1)(ii) (1994) (emphasis added). Because the Union's garnishment of Guidry's al-
ready paid and received pension benefits was an action against a bank account and
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court also stated its awareness that "garnishment in the present
context may thwart Congress' intent."15 2
On a rehearing en banc, the Tenth Circuit reaffirmed its hold-
ing that pension benefits paid and received are no longer entitled
to anti-alienation protection. 153 The court, however, added a new
impediment to the union's restitution battle with Guidry.
Notwithstanding the fact that ERISA's anti-alienation rule no
longer protected Guidry's paid and received pension benefits, the
defrauded union still could not recover those benefits. The Tenth
Circuit held that a state antigarnishment law, which ERISA no
longer preempts once the benefits have been paid out,1 5 4 exempts
the paid and received pension benefits from the reach of the
union's judgment.1 55
After the Tenth Circuit's decision, ironically, the fact that
benefits have been paid and received serves as both a boon and a
bane to defrauded employers. Although the disbursement of bene-
fits jettisons the impediment to recovery created by ERISA's anti-
alienation rule, it simultaneously creates a new barrier because
not the pension plan, it was not prohibited by the anti-alienation rule. Guidry - Local
No. 9, 10 F.3d at 709-10. The court concluded that the Treasury Regulation is not
unreasonable, id. at 710-11, and that its decision to permit attachment of Guidry's
benefits is consistent with the objectives of ERISA and Congress' approach to similar
problems in other state statutes. Id. at 711-13. The Tenth Circuit rejected Guidry's
claim that, under Colorado law and the Federal Consumer Credit Protection Act, gar-
nishment of his benefits was prohibited. Id. at 713-15. However, upon a rehearing en
banc the court concluded that ERISA did not preempt the state law, and that the
funds were protected by Colorado's exemption from garnishment. Guidry v. Sheet
Metal Worker's Nat'l Pension Fund-Local No. 9, 39 F.3d 1078, 1083-89 (10th Cir.
1994) (en banc).
151 See Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 407(a) (1988) (protecting "any future [so-
cial security] payment"); see also Veteran's Benefit Act § 3101, 38 U.S.C. § 5301(a)
(1988 & Supp. V 1993) (stating benefits not garnishable "either before or after receipt
by... beneficiary."); Railroad Retirement Act § 231, 45 U.S.C. § 231m(a) (1988) (stat-
ing no annuity is garnishable "under any circumstances whatsoever, nor shall the
payment thereof be anticipated."). The Tenth Circuit averred that "[b]ecause Con-
gress did not include similar explicit language protecting benefits in the related con-
text in ERISA, we infer Congress made a deliberate decision [that] retirement income
paid and received was not thereafter protected from garnishment." Guidry - Local
No. 9, 10 F.3d at 712.
152 Id. at 716.
153 Guidry - Local No. 9, 39 F.3d at 1080.
154 Id. at 1086. "The Colorado [law] providing an exemption to garnishment is
therefore not preempted by ERISA." Id.
155 Id. Benefits paid and received, as opposed to existing plan benefits, are not
preempted by ERISA because the Colorado anti-garnishment provision only tangen-




disbursed benefits are no longer entitled to ERISA's state law pre-
emption protection. As a result, state antigarnishment provisions
operate where previously they could not, thereby effectively sup-
planting the federally imposed anti-alienation mandate and per-
mitting an embezzler to keep his pension benefits, while leaving
that felon's employer to suffer the burden of his crime. Several
dissenting circuit judges refused to take part in the perpetuation
of this irony. They declared:
The majority has concluded a faithless servant, an embezzler, a
man who steals from the hard earned labors of the workers, is
entitled to keep the fruits of his crime. I do not believe the Colo-
rado legislature or the Colorado courts would permit such an un-
conscionable result. It is nonsensical to assume Colorado would
want a thief to keep ill-gotten gains. Like Mr. Bumble of Oliver
Twist, [we] believe that "[ilf the law supposes that,... the law is
a ass-a idiot," and [we are] not willing to believe Colorado law
to be either.' 56
D. An Employee Wrongdoing Panorama
It is worthwhile to consolidate the import of the employee
wrongdoing case law and consider the following simplified
hypothetical.
Suppose an employer sponsors an ERISA-qualified profit-
sharing plan'5 7 for the benefit of his employees and contributes
ten percent of the business net income per year to the plan. 58 In
a given year, the employer has net income of $10,000,000; there-
156 Guidry - Local No. 9, 39 F.3d at 1089 (Brorby, C.J., Anderson, J., and Tacha,
J., dissenting) (citing CHARLEs DIcKENs, OLIVER TWIST 520 (Dodd, Mead & Co. 1941)
(1838)). The dissent began its opinion with the following excerpt:
The rain it raineth on the just
And also on the unjust fella:
But chiefly on the just, because
The unjust steals the just's umbrella.
Id. at 1087 (citing CHARLEs BoWEN, Er AL., SA ERvns's BEST SHORT STORIEs (1973)).
157 For an explanation of the mechanics of a profit-sharing plan, see Treas. Reg.
§ 1.401-1(b)(1)(ii) (1994). Of course, as its name suggests, a profit-sharing plan is one
in which funding is derived directly from an employer's net profits. See generally
LANGBEIN & WoLx, supra note 1, at 45 (discussing profit-sharing plans); 1 JEFFREY D.
MAAoRsxy, EMPLOYEE BENEFTrS LAw - ERISA AND BEYoND §§ 2.01-2.08 (1980)
(same).
158 The maximum permissible deduction for an employer's contributions to a
profit-sharing plan is 15% of the total compensation paid to all plan participants. See
I.R.C. § 404(a)(3) (1994). While an employer's decision as to how much to contribute
to the plan is undoubtedly pegged to its permissible deduction, for purposes of sim-
plicity the hypothetical assumes 10% of net income is the employer's general practice.
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fore, his contribution for that year would be $1,000,000. From
previous years' contributions, there is already an existing
$4,000,000 balance in the plan. Thus, this year's contribution
would bring the total to $5,000,000.
Suppose an employee who is also a plan fiduciary steals
$500,000 directly from the pension plan. In the same year, an em-
ployee who is not a plan fiduciary steals $5,000,000, not from the
pension plan, but from the employer. Both employees are con-
victed of embezzlement in a state court of competent jurisdiction,
both have spent or otherwise hidden the stolen money, and both
have no other assets except their respective interests in the em-
ployer's profit sharing plan. The nonfiduciary employee-embez-
zler who stole $5,000,000 from the employer, thereby reducing the
employer's contribution for the year to $500,000,159 does as much
damage to his fellow employee-beneficiaries as the fiduciary who
directly steals $500,000 from the plan itself. Yet there is relief in
the form of attaching the employee's plan benefits only in the situ-
ation in which a fiduciary of the plan was the thief,1 60 although
relief of this nature is uncertain in the Fifth Circuit.' 6 1 Under
existing law, the non-fiduciary embezzler can steal that money,
indirectly causing the employer to contribute $500,000 less to the
plan that year on behalf of its beneficiaries, squander it, elect to
deposit part of the stolen funds in his pension plan,162 and keep
those benefits, in addition to his social security and veteran's ben-
efits,163 by either filing bankruptcy164 or suing the plan trustee,
159 Because the employer's net income was $10,000,000, it was reduced to
$5,000,000 by the theft. This amount multiplied by ten percent, the amount of the
yearly contribution, results in a $500,000 contribution.
160 See supra part lI.D.2. (discussing attachment of breaching fiduciary's pension
benefits permitted in Crawford v. La Boucherie Bernard, Ltd., 815 F.2d 117 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied sub nom., Goldstein v. Crawford, 484 U.S. 943 (1987)).
161 See supra part II.D.2. (discussing way Herberger v. Shanbaum, 897 F.2d 801
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 817 (1990), disallowed attachment of breaching fidu-
ciary's pension benefits).
162 See supra part I.A. (discussing how Ellis allowed anti-alienation rule to pro-
tect fraudulently earned pension contributions).
163 See supra note 151 (explaining that social security and veteran's benefits are
protected after receipt by participant).
164 See supra note 46 (explaining that debtor in bankruptcy may exclude pension
benefits from bankruptcy estate). But see 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4) (1994). The wrong-
doer's prayer for bankruptcy relief would not go uncontested because section 523(a)(4)
allows the bankruptcy court to deny a discharge from any debt "for fraud or defalca-
tion while acting in a fiduciary capacity, embezzlement, or larceny." Id.
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possibly with the DOL as amicus 6' The embezzler can do all this
despite having no dependents166 or having to flee the country
without a likely return.1 67 But then, after the money is paid out
and presumably used by the embezzler and his dependents for re-
tirement purposes, which is the rationale for protecting the bene-
fits in the first place, the employer, who has perhaps gone through
the expense of three lawsuits and three appeals,1 68 can begin to
garnish the malefactor's benefits free of ERISA's anti-alienation
obstacle a mere decade from the time it discovered that the funds
were converted. 169 However, should the employer be located in a
state that has its own antigarnishment statute, freedom from ER-
ISA's anti-alienation rule will be of no moment, and the employee-
felon's stream of pension income will be protected so that he might
further benefit from his own crime.170
Of course, such a chaotic scheme should not be attributed to
congressional design. Nevertheless, this hypothetical is illustra-
tive of the present state of the law, which ironically developed
under a judiciary concerned about defeating congressional intent.
Such chaos should be rectified by legislative action.
IV. A CRIMINAL FRAUD AMENDMENT1 7 1
A. Policy Concerns
The following proposed amendment furthers stated ERISA
goals and is offered under the assumption that Congress did not
165 See supra note 98 and accompanying text (noting DOL advocated ERISA in-
terpretation that allowed employee convicted of taking bribes to retain pension
benefits).
166 See supra part IIA. (noting embezzler had no dependents).
167 See id. (noting embezzler fled country and would not likely return).
168 See supra part HIL.B (discussing Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers Natl Pension
Fund, 493 U.S. 365 (1990)).
169 See supra part Im.C. (discussing Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n,
Local No. 9, 10 F.3d 700, 716 (10th Cir. 1993), modified, 39 F.3d 1078 (10th Cir.)
(enbanc)). Guidrys embezzlement was first discovered in 1981, Guidry, 493 U.S. at
367, but it was not until 1993 that the union obtained relief. Guidry - Local No. 9, 10
F.3d at 716.
170 See supra part mI.C. (discussing Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers Nat'l Pension
Fund, 39 F.3d 1078 (10th Cir. 1994) (en banc) and noting paid and received benefits
no longer eligible for preemption protection and therefore state antigarnishment stat-
ute protects embezzler's pension disbursements).
171 For fraud amendments similar to the one proposed herein, see Comment,
ERISA-Exceptions, supra note 17, at 352-57; Note, Employee Theft and ERISA, supra
note 17, at 338-40. Furthermore Congressman Bill Green (R. N.Y.), primarily in
response to the Ellis case, supra part IIAL, proposed a bill amending the anti-
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intend to allow an employee who has criminally defrauded his em-
ployer to benefit from his crime. From a policy standpoint, it
seems reasonable that a participant's benefits should generally be
shielded from creditors, 172 even those harmed by the participant's
negligence. 173 Promoting a secure retirement nest egg in order to
prevent an increase in the number of public charges is indeed so-
cially desirable and necessary to the country's overall economic
viability.174
alienation rule (together with necessary conforming amendments to the IRC and
ERISA's preemption provisions). H.R. 2317, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987). The
amendment proposed herein draws from all three of these sources.
172 Such a policy is consistent with principles of spendthrift trust law. See ScoTr,
supra note 7, §§ 151-52.
In many of the cases in which it has been held that by the terms of the
[spendthrift] trust the interest of a beneficiary may be put beyond the reach
of his creditors, the courts have laid some stress on the fact that the credi-
tors had only themselves to blame for extending credit to a person whose
interest under the trust had been put beyond their reach .... [Blefore ex-
tending credit they could have ascertained the extent and character of the
debtor's resources.
Id. § 157.5; cf WILLIAM L. CARY & MELVIN A. EISENBERG, CORPORATIONS 173-75 (6th
ed. 1988) (discussing voluntary creditor doctrine as reason to deny "veil piercing" in
corporate law context).
173 Negligence, even gross, does not amount to a crime; thus, the doctrine that a
wrongdoer should not profit from his crime does not operate. Furthermore, an elabo-
rate system of insurance exists to compensate victims for injury due to the negligent
conduct of others. An interesting dilemma arises when criminal negligence and reck-
lessness are the reasons for attaching pension benefits. One example is when a drunk
driver kills someone and the estate remains without compensation because the assail-
ant has no assets other than pension assets to satisfy an excess judgment. See
LANGBEIN & WOLK, supra note 1, at 458 ("What would be the basis for waiving ER-
ISA's antialienation rule for employer plaintiffs (who often have deep pockets) but not
for the poor wretch whom the wrongdoer mowed down in a drunken stupor?"). Some
commentators consider this another persuasive reason to create an exception to the
anti-alienation rule. While surely it is, unlike in the employee wrongdoing area, in
which the ERISA goals of security in the workplace and protection of plan assets are
comprised, see infra notes 249-50 and accompanying text, an exception for criminal
negligence in the reckless driving scenario is not consistent with ERISA's prime direc-
tive of providing for the retirement needs of those who have engaged in a lifetime of
useful and socially productive work. See id. Nevertheless, an exception for criminal
negligence and recklessness presents a persuasive argument.
174 See 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (1988). This section points out:
[Tihe operational scope and economic impact of such [employee benefit]
plans is increasingly interstate; ... the continued well-being and security of
millions of employees and their dependents are directly affected by the
plans; ... they are affected with a national public interest;.., they have
become an important factor affecting the stability of employment and the
successful development of industrial relations; [and] ... they have become
an important factor in commerce because of the interstate character of their
activities ....
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However, to shield pension benefits from an employer who
seeks restitution for willful and often nialicious criminal acts1 75
that reduce, either directly or indirectly, the benefits of other law
abiding pensioners or, at the very least, impair the ability of an
employer to make contributions, is contrary not only to notions of
fairness and equity but to the policies of ERISA itself.176
In recognition of these thwarted policies, the following
amendment requires that the plan itself or the employer, or both,
and therefore the employer's ability to contribute to the plan,17 7
must have been damaged.
B. The Amendment
1. The Anti-Alienation Rule
Section 1056(d)(1) of the ERISA should be amended to include
the following language (indicated by italics):1 7
(1) Each pension plan shall provide that benefits provided under
the plan may not be assigned or alienated and may not be sub-
ject to attachment, garnishment, levy, execution, or other legal or
equitable process, either before or after receipt by a beneficiary of
such plan.
The language, "and may not be subject to attachment, gar-
nishment, levy, execution or other legal or equitable process,"
merely codifies the language contained in relevant Treasury Regu-
Id.; see also H.R. REP. No. 807, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 4676 (1974), reprinted in 1974
U.S.C.C-A.N. 4670, 4676 ("One of the most important matters of public policy facing
the nation today is how to assure that individuals who have spent their careers in
useful and socially productive work will have adequate income to meet their needs
when they retire."); Snyder, supra note 2, at 219.
'75 See infra note 249 (discussing legislative history which suggests Congress did
not intend to protect benefits of criminals at expense of employers).
176 See supra note 2 (discussing these ERISA policies). If an embezzler and his
dependents become wards of the state and suffer an indigent retirement age because
their retirement benefits were consumed to recompense other law-abiding pensioners
who suffered as a result of the embezzler's deed, then so be it. Perhaps that is the
price of having led a nefarious but, no doubt, luxurious preretirement lifestyle.
177 See supra part M.D. (offering hypothetical illustrating way pension plans are
injured). An employer that maintains a profit-sharing plan has fewer profits to con-
tribute to the plan when an employee has embezzled from it. Furthermore, even
when an employee maintains a pension fund other than a profit-sharing plan, the
fund's beneficiaries are still damaged by an embezzlement because employers often
make matching contributions. See LANGBEIN & WOLK, supra note 1, at 209 (discuss-
ing matching contributions).
178 Naturally, a conforming amendment to ERISA's anti-alienation rule's sister
provision in the IRC should be enacted. See I.R.C. § 401(a)(13) (West Supp. 1994).
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lations that seem to have acquired the force of law. 179 Inclusion of
this language in the anti-alienation provision is recommended to
foreclose any plain meaning argument,18 0 and to quiet any linger-
ing dispute regarding whether the anti-alienation rule precludes
both voluntary and involuntary attachments of pension bene-
fits. 8 ' Both the plain meaning argument and attachment issues
remained unanswered after the enactment of ERISA, and their
resolution required creative judicial reasoning because of the
scant legislative history on the purpose of the anti-alienation
rule."8 2 The language, "either before or after receipt by a benefici-
ary of such plan," is taken from section 5301(a) of the Veterans'
Benefits Act ("VBA"), 1'8  and is intended to mandate that pension
benefits paid and received are to obtain protection, as they do
under both the VBA and the Social Security Act.18 4 Its inclusion
would resolve the problem created by the Tenth Circuit's decision
in Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers International Ass'n, Local No.
9,185 wherein the court held that the anti-alienation rule does not
protect benefits paid and received. It appears to make little sense
to adopt a system such as ERISA, which affords as much as four
decades of pre-retirement protection to pension benefits to ensure
that an employee and his dependents have adequate retirement
resources, but suspends that protection when that employee goes
to use them in his retirement years.8 "
179 See Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)-13(b)(1).
180 See Employee Theft and ERISA, supra note 17, at 328 n.64. (discussing argu-
ment that because "Congress failed to specifically proscribe garnishment in section
105(d) while doing so in other comparable statutes," garnishment is permissible).
181 See General Motors Corp. v. Buha, 623 F.2d 455, 460 (6th Cir. 1980) (holding
that section 1056(d)(1) precludes both voluntary and involuntary attachment; describ-
ing both rational and counter argument).
182 See supra note 7 (discussing legislative history of rule).
183 See 38 U.S.C. § 5501(a) (Supp. V 1993).
184 See supra note 151 (citing protective language in Social Security Act).
185 See supra part III.C.
186 See supra note 155 (dealing with garnishment of pension benefits already paid
to participant); see also Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n, Local No. 9, 10
F.3d 700, 716 (10th Cir. 1993) (acknowledging that garnishment of pension benefits




2. The Criminal Fraud Addition
Section 1056(d) of ERISA should be amended by adding the
following paragraph at the end:1 8 7
(4)(A) Paragraph (1) of this subsection shall not apply if an em-
ployer of a plan participant, a subrogee of a right of such em-
ployer, an employee organization, or a subrogee of a right of such
employee organization, obtains a judgment, decree, or order in a
state court of competent jurisdiction for an act of fraud, theft,
conversion, or embezzlement committed by the plan participant
which has caused a reduction of plan assets and/or a loss to the
employer or employee organization, and which act forms the ba-
sis for a criminal conviction of or a guilty or nolo contendere plea
by the plan participant. The preceding sentence shall apply only
to the extent of such reduction and/or loss suffered by the plan,
employer, and/or employee organization that the court deter-
mines resulted from such act of fraud, theft, conversion, or em-
bezzlement and shall apply only when such criminal conviction
or plea is final and unappealable.
This portion of the amendment would cover both the Type 2
and Type 3 nonfiduciary employee wrongdoing cases discussed
previously, while excepting from its provisions Type 1 cases in
which the employer seeks to recover more than the amount stolen
by the participant.1 8 8 Ellis National Bank v. Irving Trust Co. -89 is
particularly useful as an illustration of this point.
Recall that in Ellis, Bache & Co. alleged that the employee
had cost it over $3,000,000 in funds that it had to pay back to its
defrauded customers. Of itself, this allegation would be insuffi-
cient for recovery under the proposed amendment. It would have
to be proven that the employee actually converted funds from
Bache. Moreover, recovery would be limited to that amount
proved stolen-not necessarily $3,000,000.
Also covered by this portion of the amendment through the
"reduction of plan assets" language are the defalcating fiduciary
cases.' 90 To avoid confusion, it may be advisable to include a pas-
sage stating that nothing in the amendment shall be deemed to
187 Naturally, a conforming amendment should be made to the Internal Revenue
Code sister provision to the anti-alienation rule contained in the ERC. See I.R.C.
§ 401(a)(13) (West Supp. 1994).
188 See supra part M.AL (evidencing Type 1 scenario).
189 786 F.2d 466, 468 (2d Cir. 1986); see also supra part llIA (describing Ellis as
example of type 3 case)
190 190. See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text (discussing Herberger,
Coar, Solmsen, and Crawford).
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limit the effect of the fiduciary breach remedial provisions con-
tained in ERISA.' 9 '
The subrogee language is included in deference to the McCar-
ran-Ferguson Act,192 which provides that insurance industry reg-
ulation is generally a matter for the states, 193 and that "[n]o Act
of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede
any law enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the
business of insurance."1 94 ERISA defers to the McCarran-Fergu-
son Act through its preemption "savings clause,"1 95  and the
Supreme Court has interpreted the phrase "business of insurance"
to include the regulation of the substantive terms of insurance
contracts.1 96 As subrogation clauses are often included in insur-
ance contracts, it seems wise to expressly provide for their effectu-
ation in the amendment. Certainly insurers would bring claims
as subrogees of employers, 97 and employee-wrongdoers would as-
sert, in the absence of express subrogee language, that only an
employer is authorized to bring a claim under the amendment.
Insurers might then raise a McCarran-Ferguson argument. In-
clusion of the subrogee language is intended to foreclose this
possibility.
Apart from McCarran-Ferguson deference, it seems that
omitting a right of subrogation from any criminal fraud amend-
ment would deter insurers from underwriting policies for employ-
ers. This would in turn be detrimental to the security of the
ERISA pension system. Insurance coverage promotes the finan-
191 See supra note 74 (discussing fiduciary breach remedial provisions).
192 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1988).
193 15 U.S.C. § 1012(a).
194 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (emphasis added).
195 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (1988); see supra note 8 (discussing ERISA saving
clause).
196 Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 742-43 (1985). The
Metropolitan Life Court outlined the following three tests to determine whether par-
ticular insurance practices fall within the "business of insurance" language of the Mc-
Carron-Ferguson Act: "'[Flirst, whether the practice has the effect of transferring or
spreading a policyholder's risk; second, whether the practice is an intergral part of the
policy relationship between the insurer and the insured; and third, whether the prac-
tice is limited to entities within the insurance industry.'" Id. at 743. (quoting Union
Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Piriena, 458 U.S. 119, 129 (1982)) (emphasis in original) (cita-
tions omitted). "Application of these principles suggests that mandated-benefit laws
are state regulation of the business of insurance." Id.
197 See St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Cox, 752 F.2d 550, 551 (11th Cir. 1985)
(dealing with situation in which defrauded employer received insurance proceeds, and
insurer brought claim to attach pension benefits pursuant to right of subrogation).
708 [Vol. 68:667
CRIMINAL FRAUD AMENDMENT
cial stability of the employer and, somewhat less directly, the sta-
bility of the pension plan.
The terms "employer" and "employee organization" contained
in this portion of the amendment are defined terms under
ERISA.198 Because the definition of "employer" probably would
not include the labor union that was the plaintiff in Guidry and of
which Guidry was a member, the term "employee organization" is
included to cover defrauded unions and other similar
organizations.
Finally, other commentators have insisted that any amend-
ment contain language to the effect that any remedy pursued
thereunder must be one of last resort, i.e., other garnishable as-
sets of the defalcator must first have been pursued and exhausted
before the amendment's remedy is invoked.1 99 Such language has
not been included here because it is deemed unnecessary. In each
of the employee wrongdoing cases discussed in this Note, it may
be readily inferred that the only substantial asset to which the
employee had legal title was his pension benefits. Furthermore,
in these cases, the judgments entered were generally well in ex-
cess of the total pension benefits.2 0 0 Therefore, if the employee did
possess assets other than his pension benefits, surely the em-
ployer would have already sought to attach such assets as they
would not be encumbered with a congressionally mandated alien-
ation prohibition to complicate or, after Guidry, stifle the em-
ployer's restitution attempts. Lastly, in the cases in which the
judgment amount is less than the existing balance of the pension
benefits, substantial early withdrawal penalties could be imposed
upon the wrongdoer.2 0 1 There exists, therefore, a strong incentive
for the employee to voluntarily "cough up" any existing nonpen-
198 See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1002(4), 1002(5) (1988).
199 See Employee Theft and ERISA, supra note 17, at 340; Strengthening ERISA's
Protection, supra note 17, at 355.
200 See Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers Natl Pension Fund, 493 U.S. 365, 368
(1990) (judgment entered against plan trustee for $275,000); United Metal Prod. v.
National Bank, 811 F.2d 297 (6th Cir. 1987) (describing employee whose pension ac-
count contained $35,385.64, but against whom $441,408.72 judgment was entered for
defrauding employer), cert. dismissed, 485 U.S. 1017 (1988); Ellis Natl Bank v. Irving
Trust Co., 786 F.2d 461, 469 (2d Cir. 1986) (describing pension plan account contain-
ing $144,538.61 under savings plan and more than $33,000 under supplementry plan
for employee against whom judgments totaling $210,430.46 were entered).
201 See I.R.C. § 72(t)(1)-(2)(A)(i) (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (requiring 10% penalty for
distributions occurring before participant reaches age 59 1/2).
1994]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
sion assets hidden or otherwise placed outside the judgment's
purview.
3. The Killer-Law Addition
Section 1056(d) of ERISA should be amended by adding the
following paragraph at the end:
(4)(B) Paragraph (1) of this subsection shall not apply to a judg-
ment, decree, or order entered in a state court of competent juris-
diction which divests a surviving spouse of rights to a qualified
joint and survivor annuity and/or qualified pre-retirement survi-
vor annuity, provided that such surviving spouse has been con-
victed of or has pled guilty to the intentional, willful, or deliber-
ate killing of his or her plan participant spouse in a state court of
competent jurisdiction, and such conviction or plea is final and
unappealable.
This paragraph would foreclose any possibility that a mur-
derer might be able to enjoy the pension benefits of a spouse that
he or she has killed. Although the courts that considered the issue
have held that the individual should not receive the benefits,
20 2
the exception should be codified. ERISA's policy of securing funds
for use by the participant and his dependents in their retirement
years does not operate and would not be served when a dependent
intentionally, willfully, or deliberately killed his or her plan par-
ticipant spouse. The Amendment, however, would not apply to a
person convicted of the criminally reckless or criminally negligent
homicide of his or her ERISA spouse as, for example, when a wife
is driving a car in which her ERISA-participant husband is killed
because of the wife's criminally negligent driving. The wife's
QPSA entitlement should be protected in this instance, as would
be a plan participant's interest if he were found guilt of criminally
negligent actions.20 3
4. Conforming Amendments to ERISA's Preemption Provision
Section 1144(b) of ERISA should be amended by adding the
following paragraph:
202 See supra note 54 (discussing cases which prohibit person who murders
spouse from receiving pension benefits of spouse).
203 See Guidry, 493 U.S. at 376 (holding judicial exception to ERISA's anti-aliena-
tion rule for criminal conduct is inappropriate given congressional policy choice "to
safeguard a stream of income for pensioners").
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(9) Subsection (a) shall not apply to any state court judgment,
decree, or order prescribed in sections 1056(d)(4)(A) or
1056(d)(4)(B) of this title unless such judgment, decree, or order
is used to effectuate the remedial provisions of such sections.
This paragraph is included to make it clear that the foregoing
amendments shall not be construed to allow any entities, other
than those listed in the amendment, to avail themselves of the
remedial provisions stated therein. This would foreclose the re-
mote possibilty of creating "a boundless endless stream of suits
and disputes" 20 4 in the ERISA pension area, which was the pri-
mary reason judges offered for refusing to impose a criminal fraud
exception.
V. CoNGREssIoNAL RELUCTANCE
The proposed legislative amendment, while sufficient to clar-
ify the area and address payment inequities, cannot be effective if
it is not enacted. It is essential, therefore, for the Supreme Court
to be able to create a judicial exception because, for the reasons
that follow, Congress is reluctant to act.
There are several probable reasons for Congress' inaction.
First, it is too busy to expend the time to correct an injustice that
is adjudicated so infrequently. In the twenty years since ERISA's
enactment, the federal courts have considered a mere ten cases
involving employee fraud.20 5 In five of them, the courts have
found a way to attach the employees' pension benefits.2 0 6 This
statistic, however, fails to consider the inestimable number of em-
ployers that decide not to pursue a restitution remedy in the
204 Vink v. SHV N. Am. Holding Corp., 549 F. Supp. 268, 273 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
205 Four of the cases involved defalcating fiduciaries, see supra part 1.D.2. (dis-
cussing Crawford, Coar, Solmsen, and Herberger), and six involved the criminal fraud
of nonfiduciary-employee wrongdoers. See supra parts ]I., IH.B. and I.C. (dis-
cussing Vink, Cox, Ellis, United Metal, Guidry, and Gaudet). Pomeranke v. William-
'son, 478 N.W.2d 899 (Minn. 1991) was a Minnesota state court opinion and is not a
true employee wrongdoing case. See supra note 146. Thus it is not included with
these 10 cases considered by the federal courts. Similarly, although In re Bell & Beck-
with, 5 F.3d 150 (6th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1060 (1994) involved employee
wrongdoing, the Sixth Circuit did not invoke the anti-alienation rule because the pen-
sion funds that the trustee in bankruptcy would recoup were really not pension funds
at all as those contributions were deemed void ab initio. See supra note 146 (discuss-
ing Pomeranke and Bell & Beckwith in greater detail).
206 See supra part H.D.2. (discussing Crawford, Coar, and Solmsen, which per-
mitted attachment of breaching fiduciary's pension benefits); part HIIA. and note 106
(discussing Cox which permitted attachment of nonfiduciary employee-wrongdoer's
pension benefits).
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courts because of the formidable impediment the anti-alienation
rule presents to recovery, in addition to the legal expenses an em-
ployer would incur to litigate such a case.
Second, proliferating divorce20 7 and child support payment
delinquency rates208 virtually compelled Congress to act in 1984
to correct the injustices that occurred when some courts construed
the anti-alienation rule to exclude former spouses and dependents
from sharing in the breadwinner spouse's pension proceeds.20 9 In
comparison, although the wrongdoer cases arise relatively infre-
quently, they nevertheless result in manifest injustices by al-
lowing a wrongdoer to keep pension funds at the expense of other
plan participants and their dependents.
Third, the Treasury Department, the administrative agency
charged with enforcing and interpreting the anti-alienation rule,
is unlikely to lobby for change.2 1 0 The Treasury Department, de-
207 See Langbein & Wolk, supra note 1, at 434 (quoting Pension Equity for Wo-
men: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Labor Management Relations of the House
Comm. on Education and Labor, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1983) (statement of Con-
gresswoman Geraldine Ferraro)). Congresswoman Ferraro stated
Women are shortchanged by private pension plans because the system does
not truly recognize the contributions that women make to the economy or
take into account women's unique work patterns, patterns which revolve
around childrearing and other family responsibilities. [The homemaker] is
dependent on her husband and his earnings and at the mercy of death or
divorce.
Id.; Surge in Divorces: New Crisis in Middle Age, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Dec.
20, 1976, at 56 ("Tlihe number of divorced and separated Americans 45 years and
older was 4.4 million [in 1974], nearly twice as many as ten years earlier.").
208 See Camilla E. Watson, Broken Promises Revisited: The Window of Vulnera-
bility for Surviving Spouses Under ERISA, 76 Iowa L. Rev. 431, 473 n.295. (1991)
("Statistics showed that 25% to 33 'I% of men never paid any child support and only
about 10% paid on time and in full."); see also David Whitman, New State Laws Seek
to Bolster Child-Support Payments; The Children Who Get Cut Out, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REPORT, Oct. 12, 1987, at 24 ("Among all families with absent fathers almost
60 percent received no child support in 1985"); Lynn Langway et al., Rounding Up
Delinquent Dads, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 6, 1984, at 76 ("[Alccording to the recent Census
Bureau report, more than half of the 5.4 million women and children who are sup-
posed to be receiving aid get less than their court ordered due; 28 percent or
nothing.").
209 See supra part TI.A.3. (discussing division among courts on whether there was
exception to anti-alienation rule for family support judgments prior to enactment of
REA in 1984).
210 Although the Secretary of Labor is broadly authorized to interpret ERISA and
promulgate regulations thereunder, see 29 U.S.C. § 1135, "the authority of the De-
partment of Labor to issue regulations under ERISA's [anti-alienation provision] is
... lodged in the Department of the Treasury." Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers Intl
Ass'n, Local No. 9, 10 F.3d 700,709 (10th Cir. 1993), modified, 39 F.2d 1078 (10th Cir.
1994) (en banc); accord Hurwitz v. Sher, 982 F.2d 778, 779 n.1. (2d Cir. 1992), cert.
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spite reinforcing the anti-alienation provision by promulgating
regulations,211 is exempt by virtue of the supremacy clause from
its own prohibition against attaching an employee's pension bene-
fits through the garnishment process.21 2 Thus, the Treasury has
little incentive to advocate an exception for employee wrongdoing.
Fourth, the most egregious cases evidencing the need for an
exception to the anti-alienation provision, those that would virtu-
ally compel congressional attention, have not reached the circuit
courts. In two such cases, the plaintiff-wrongdoers failed to raise
an anti-alienation argument. In a third, a district court inappo-
sitely construed ERISA's provisions to avoid a harsh result. In
Mendez-Bellido v. Board of Trustees of Division 1181, AT. U.,213
Carlos Mendez, an ERISA plan participant, was killed by his sec-
ond wife who was then convicted of first-degree manslaughter.2" 4
As one of Carlos' surviving spouse s, his second wife possessed the
right to a qualified preretirement survival annuity ("QPSA") and
was therefore entitled to receive Carlos' pension benefits begin-
ning at the time he would have reached age fifty-five.
2 15 Carlos'
first wife made a claim on behalf of her children for the benefits
provided under the plan. The pension fund's appeal board denied
her claim based on Carlos' second wife's entitlement to the
denied, 113 S. Ct 2345 (1993). See generally Guidry-Local No. 9, 10 F.3d at 708-09
(explaining confusion over who had authority to issue regulations under anti-aliena-
tion rule and resolving issue in Treasury Department's favor).
Recall that in 1979 the Secretary of Labor filed suit in Winer v. Edison Bros.
Stores Pension Plan, 593 F.2d 307 (8th Cir. 1979), to help employees accused of re-
ceiving illegal kickbacks retain their pension benefits. See supra note 98. The court
in Vink v. SHV N. Am. Holding Corp., 549 F. Supp. 268 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) subsequently
interpreted Winer to mean that the DOL disfavored the recognition of any criminal
fraud exception to ERISA. See id. at 271-72. As is pointed out in footnote 98, Winer
involved an employer that refused to pay pension benefits to an employee that it
merely accused of having received kickbacks-a typical "bad boy" forfeiture. On the
other hand, Vink and the wrongdoing cases herein discussed involved employees who
had been convicted in a state court of criminally defrauding their employers. See id.;
see also supra part I. It cannot be said, therefore, that the DOL opposed a criminal
fraud exception to the anti-alienation rule in a situation in which there has been a
criminal adjudication of guilt with due regard for every notion of fairness and due
process as required by the Constitution.
211 See supra note 7 (citing text of Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)-13(b)(1), which rein-
forces anti-alienation rule by disqualifying plan from special tax treatment if it is
assignable or alienable).
212 See supra part II-4. (explaining that federal tax liens are exempt from anti-
alienation provision).
213 709 F. Supp. 329 (E.D.N.Y. 1989).
214 Id. at 330.
215 Id.; see supra note 42 (relating to how REA protects QPSAs).
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QPSA.216 The court held, however, that Carlos' second wife was
precluded from receiving the pension benefits based on "New York
law" which "prohibit[s] a killer from profiting from her [own]
crime."217
Similarly, in New Orleans Electrical Pension Fund v. De-
Rocha,218 the court, relying heavily on Mendez-Bellido, held that a
surviving spouse who had shot and killed her husband was pre-
cluded from receiving a QPSA. The court based its decision on the
equitable doctrine that a wrongdoer should not profit from his or
her own crime.219
The results in these two cases are patently fair and consistent
with the socially desirable outcome advocated in this Note. It is
suggested, however, that the results reached by these courts can-
not be reconciled with Guidry. Each court deliberately skirted the
fact that ERISA preempts state law "relat[ing] to any employee
benefit plan.2 0 The Mendez-Bellido court's rationale for creating
this implied exception was based on decisions involving state in-
surance law, wherein courts refused to allow beneficiaries con-
victed of murdering the insured to receive insurance proceeds,22 1
and state testamentary law, which forbids one who slays another
from taking under his will or through intestacy.2 2 These deci-
sions are distinguishable. Unlike a life insurance policy, under
which a killer-beneficiary gets the proceeds from the policy imme-
diately, the earliest the surviving spouses in DeRocha and Men-
dez-Bellido could have received the decedents' benefits, had they
been awarded their entitlement under the QPSAs, was at the de-
216 Mendez-Bellido, 709 F. Supp. at 330.
217 Id. at 331 (emphasis added). In reaching this decision, the court had to find,
and did find, that ERISA does not preempt the state common law rule that prohibits
one from profiting from his own crimes. Id.
218 779 F. Supp. 845 (E.D. La. 1991).
219 Id. at 849-50.
220 See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a); see also supra note 8 (discussing preemption).
221 Mendez-Bellido, 709 F. Supp. at 332-33.
222 Id. at 330; see Riggs v. Palmer, 22 N.E. 188 (N.Y. 1889). One of the arguments
for reforming a will to preclude a beneficiary who has murdered a testator from bene-
fitting was that the testator harbored an implied wish that a beneficiary who had
killed him would not take under his will. In contrast, a plan participant's implied
wish, or any other desire, is rendered irrelevant by the terms of the statute, as Con-
gress has made the public policy choice that after one year of marriage a spouse can-
not be divested of her entitlement without her consent within the applicable waiver
period. Thus, the Mendez-Bellido court's analogy is misplaced and inappropriate.
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cedents' minimum retirement age of fifty-five.223 Furthermore,
unlike a life insurance policy, under which the insured can change
designated beneficiaries at his or her option, or a will, in which
beneficiaries can be freely supplanted, a qualified retirement plan
requires that a surviving spouse entitled to a QPSA relinquish
that entitlement only if the spouse consents in a notarized writ-
ing within an ERISA-mandated election period. 25
The import of the foregoing is that, unlike the insurance and
will scenarios in which the decision to kill a spouse may often be
fueled by a desire to receive money before the killer ordinarily
would have, or to prevent the insured from changing his benefici-
ary or a testator from changing her will, the decision to kill an
ERISA plan participant does not stem from a desired increase or
acceleration of the benefit the nonparticipant spouse can or will
recieve. The surviving "ERISA spouse" must wait to receive the
benefits and cannot, without granting consent, be stripped of her
survivor's share. Thus, the surviving spouses in DeRocha and
Mendez-Bellido did not "profit" from their crimes at all, and under
the circumstances of the two cases, application of the doctrine that
a wrongdoer should not profit from her own crime is misplaced.
To be sure, these are tenuous distinctions. But when coupled with
the fact that ERISA, unlike insurance or testamentary law, con-
tains preemption and anti-alienation provisions, which are
equally applicable to surviving spouses as they are to initial plan
participants, 2 6 the exceptions created in DeRocha and Mendez-
223 See 29 U.S.C. § 1055(e)(1)(B) ("[Tihe earliest the surviving spouse may receive
a payment under... [a QPSA] is not later than the month in which the participant
would have attained the earliest retirement age under the plan.").
224 See 29 U.S.C. § 1055(c)(2)(A)(iii); e.g., United Parcel Serv. v. Riley, 532
N.Y.S.2d 473, 474 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk Couty 1988) (stating that beneficiary change can
be effected only by written spousal consent). But see Watson, supra note 208, at 500
(noting possible exception for spousal abandonment).
225 See 29 U.S.C. § 1055(c)(7)(B) (defining the "applicable election period to begin
on the first day of the plan year in which the participant attains age 35").
226 It appears that no court has directly considered the issue of whether the provi-
sions are equally applicable to spouses because the anti-alienation rule's applicability
to surviving spouses is unquestioned. Elemental deduction based on the plain mean-
ing of the anti-alienation provision leads to this conclusion. The rule states that "ben-
efits provided under the plan" are to receive alienation protection. 29 U.S.C.
§ 1056(d)(1) (1988). The rule does not limit its application to plan participants. Since
benefits provided to a surviving spouse under a QPSA are derived from plan assets,
they are indeed "benefits provided under the plan" within the plain meaning of the
rule. Thus, they must be benefits to which alienation protection is afforded. Further-
more, although no party to the suit in New Orleans Elec. Pension Fund v. Newman,
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Bellido cannot be reconciled with ERISA's provisions as construed
by the Supreme Court in Guidry.
Furthermore, the plaintiffs in DeRocha and Mendez-Bellido
were the pension plans, and the surviving spouses who were de-
nied otherwise guaranteed retirement benefits did not appear. 2 7
As a result, neither plaintiff raised the argument that because the
benefits under the QPSA were not to be paid out to the surviving
spouse until the decedent would have reached retirement age, the
anti-alienation rule of ERISA continued to apply to the surviving
spouse and, therefore, she could not be stripped of those
benefits.2 28
By contrast, in New Orleans Electrical Pension Fund v. New-
man,2 9 although a killer-beneficiary raised an anti-alienation ar-
gument,23 ° the court held that she was to be stripped of her QPSA
entitlement.23 ' While just, this decision cannot be reconciled from
a statutory interpretation standpoint with ERISA's preemption
and QPSA waiver provisions or the Supreme Court's decision in
Guidry.
Mrs. Newman, who had killed her ERISA participant spouse,
was entitled to receive a $3,000 death benefit payable immedi-
ately and a QPSA, which was to begin not before her spouse would
have reached retirement age.2 3 2 Thus, the anti-alienation rule
was applicable to Mrs. Newman's receipt of the QPSA. 3
Although the $3,000 death benefit payment was the fruit of Mrs.
Newman's crime, the QPSA could not be considered as such be-
cause it was to begin on the date Mr. Newman would have reached
his earliest retirement age-a date not accelerated by his
death. 3 4 Nevertheless, the court stripped Mrs. Newman of the
QPSA as well.235
784 F. Supp. 1233 (E.D. La. 1992) contested this issue, the court assumed that the
rule applies to surviving spouses. See id. at 1236-37.
227 Mendez-Bellido v. Board of Trustees of Division, 1181, A.T.U., 709 F. Supp.
329, 330 n.1 (E.D.N.Y. 1989); New Orlenas Electrical Pension Fund v. DeRocha, 779
F. Supp. 845, 848 (E.D. La. 1991).
228 See Mendez-Bellido, 709 F. Supp. at 333 (noting pension fund's neglect in fail-
ing to submit reply papers).
229 784 F. Supp. 1233 (E.D. La. 1992); see also supra note 54 (listing additional
cases).
230 See Newman, 784 F. Supp. at 1236.
231 Id. at 1238; see also supra note 54 (discussing court's reasoning).
232 Newman, 784 F. Supp. at 1236-37.
233 See id.
234 See supra notes 223-28 and accompanying text (discussing this assertion).
235 Newman, 784 F. Supp. at 1237.
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In reaching its conclusion, the court made three broad obser-
vations. First, the court observed that state killer laws are not
preempted by ERISA.2 36 Second, even assuming arguendo that
state killer laws are preempted, neither the anti-alienation rule
nor Guidry is offended by its holding.237 And third, the court
found that a Louisiana civil law finding that Mrs. Newman is an
"unworthy heir" constitutes a valid waiver of a QPSA because it is
tantamount to abandonment, which the Treasury Regulations
state is a valid waiver.2 38 It is suggested, however, that none of
these conclusions can be supported by ERISA's provisions as con-
strued by the various federal courts.
First, state testamentary law, which encompasses state killer
laws, is preempted by ERISA.23 9 Second, the court's determina-
tion that Mrs. Newman's QPSA could be waived by analogy to
abandonment as defined in the Treasury Regulations was based
on an IRS Private Letter Ruling, 0 which by the court's own ad-
mission has no precedential value.24' Third, the Newman decision
offends the Guidry Court's sweeping pronouncement that there
are no exceptions for criminal conduct to ERISA's anti-alienation
rule. 2  The Supreme Court has stated:
A court attempting to carve out an exception that would not
swallow the [anti-alienation] rule would be forced to determine
whether application of the rule in particular circumstances
would be "especially" inequitable. The impracticability of defin-
ing such a standard reinforces our conclusion that the identifica-
tion of any exception should be left to Congress.243
236 Id. at 1236.
237 Id. at 1236-37.
238 Id. at 1237-38.
239 Maclean v. Ford Motor Co., 831 F.2d 723, 728 (7th Cir. 1987); Iron Worker's
Mid-South Pension Fund v. Stoll, 771 F. Supp. 781, 785 (E.D. La. 1991); see Shaw v.
Delta Airlines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 98 (1983) (ERISA's preemption language designed to
implement broadest possible interpretation); E-Systems, Inc. v. Pogue, 929 F.2d 1100,
1103 (5th Cir. 1991) ("Reflective of the broad reach of the statute, the Supreme Court
has found preemption of state laws which only collaterally or indirectly affected em-
ployee benefit plans."), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 585 (1991). But see Ridgway v. Ridg-
way, 454 U.S. 46, 60 (1981) (stating that although Servicemen's Group Life Insurance
Act and beneficiary designation override state law, there could exist "extreme fact
situations or ... instances where the beneficiary has obtained the proceeds through
fraudulent or illegal means as, for example, where the named beneficiary murders the
insured service member").
24o Newman, 784 F. Supp. at 1238 n.9.
241 Id.
242 Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers Natl Pension Fund, 493 U.S. 365, 376 (1990).
243 Id. at 377 (emphasis added).
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One would be hard pressed to envision what could be more
"'especially' inequitable" than allowing a wife who has killed her
husband to enjoy his pension benefits. Nevertheless, the Supreme
Court has said that especially inequitable circumstances are the
province of Congress and not the judiciary.
Obviously, because of their bizarre and tragic circumstances,
cases like Mendez-Bellido, DeRocha, and Newman arise infre-
quently. The courts, however, were hard pressed to reconcile the
ERISA provisions so tightly embraced by the Guidry Court with
the inconsistent but socially desirable results they themselves
reached. If one accepts the Guidry Court's interpretation that
Congress intended to safeguard the pension benefits of a scurri-
lous embezzler for use by him and his dependents during his re-
tirement years, it is not such a stretch to believe that the Supreme
Court would have also found that Congress intended that a sur-
viving spouse, incarcerated for the manslaughter of her long-time
abusive husband,2 should have her congressionally mandated
share available for use by her and her dependents in her retire-
ment years. After all, even a spouse convicted of manslaughter,
like an embezzler, eventually will be freed and will experience re-
tirement needs. 45 Finally, the unlikelihood that another such
case will arise and perhaps require that a murderer receive the
victim's pension benefits is further reason why Congress is un-
likely to act to create a statutory exception such as the one pro-
posed herein.
VI. THE SuPREME COURT SHOULD RECONSIDER ITS POSITION
Congressional reluctance raises a fundamental question: Did
Congress really intend, as the Supreme Court's refusal to carve
out an equitable exception for criminal fraud suggests, to promote
the right of a criminal and his family members to enjoy stolen
property?2 46 It is suggested that the Supreme Court's refusal ef-
244 See James Endrst, 'Confessions of Crime' Opens Lineup; Lifetime Cable In-
troduces Three Original Series, HARTFORD CouRANT, July 19, 1991, at 16 (noting that
wife in Mendez-Bellido was victim of abuse by husband).
245 See Mendez-Bellido v. Board of Trustees, 1181, AT.U., 709 F. Supp. 329, 330
(E.D.N.Y. 1989) (wife sentenced to only two-to-six-year term of imprisonment); New
Orleans Elec. Pension Fund v. DeRocha, 779 F. Supp. 845, 846 (E.D. La. 1991) (sur-
viving spouse sentenced to ten years hard labor but sentence reduced to five years
probation); New Orleans Elec. Pension Fund v. Newman, 784 F. Supp. 1233, 1234
(E.D. La. 1992) (wife sentenced to fifteen years).
246 See LANGBEIN & WoLK, supra note 1, at 457; ScoTr, supra note 7, § 157.5, at
220 ("[There seems to be something rather shocking in the notion that a man should
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fectively defeats use in the ERISA pension area of the ancient eq-
uitable doctrine that a wrongdoer should not profit from his
crime.247 If this were in fact Congress' intention, which its inac-
tion could lead us to believe, the Supreme Court would be com-
pletely justified in refusing to sustain the implied exception sev-
eral judges saw fit to create. ms It is submitted that such could not
have been Congress' intention. There is no doubt that those mem-
bers of Congress who enacted ERISA chose to protect individuals
who contributed to, rather than harmed, society.2 4 9 Indeed, for
this reason, the equitable doctrine continues to live and breathe in
the federal common law.25°
A A Conundrum of Conflicting ERISA Policies
It is clear that Congress' policy choice was to protect the re-
tirement income of all plan participants, including wrongdoers, as
the Supreme Court and other courts that refused to create implied
exceptions for criminal fraud make clear.251 It is suggested, how-
ever, that in precluding the union from recovering on behalf of its
members the funds stolen by Guidry, the Guidry Court is vulnera-
ble to the argument that not all plan participants and their depen-
dents are being protected. When an ERISA participant who is not
found to have breached a fiduciary duty owed to the plan under
be allowed to continue in the enjoyment of property without satisfying the claims of
persons whom he has injured.").
247 See New York Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Armstrong, 117 U.S. 591, 600 (1886) ("It
would be a reproach to the jurisprudence of the country if one could recover insurance
money payable on the death of the party whose life he had felioniously taken.").
248 See St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Cox, 752 F.2d 550, 552 (11th Cir. 1985)
(per curiam) (finding criminal misconduct exception to non-alienability provision of
ERISA); Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers Natl Pension Fund, 856 F.2d 1457 (10th Cir.
1988), rev'd, 493 U.S. 365 (1990); cf. United Metal Prods. Corp. v. National Bank of
Detroit, 811 F.2d 297, 300-01 (6th Cir. 1987) (Wellford, C.J., dissenting).
249 The House Ways and Means Committee remarked that "tone of the most im-
portant matters of public policy facing the nation today is how to assure that individu-
als who have spent their careers in useful and socially productive work will have ade-
quate incomes to meet their needs when they retire." H.R. REP. No. 807, 93d Cong., 2d
Sess. (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4670, 4676 (emphasis added). Embez-
zlers do not do useful or socially productive work. Their "work" is useful only with
respect to themselves and perhaps their dependents, who may or may not be blame-
less or who share, albeit unwittingly, in the spoils of the embezzler's crime. Further-
more, embezzlement is socially destructive. This analysis seems to lead to the conclu-
sion that embezzlers and the like were not meant to be protected by Congress.
250 See infra note 256 (discussing federal common law).
251 See, e.g., Vink v. SHV N. Am. Holding Corp., 549 F. Supp. 268, 273 (S.D.N.Y.
1982) ("Congress has spoken, and... [ERISA] makes [it] clear that the pension bene-
fits of both faithless employees.., and faithful ones are to be protected.").
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ERISA, as in Guidry, steals funds from either the plan itself or the
employer-thereby reducing the employer's ability to contribute
to the plan- 2 2 and there is no exception recognized, the ERISA
policy of protecting all participants and their dependents cannot
be served, as it is at odds with the policy announced by the
Supreme Court of protecting even the wrongdoer's and his depen-
dents' retirement benefits. In other words, disallowing the excep-
tion helps the wrongdoer and his dependents and hurts the plan
and its beneficiaries, while creating the exception protected the
plan and its beneficiaries but hurts the wrongdoer and his depen-
dents. Obviously, Congress' intent, which according to Guidry
was to protect all, cannot be saved. The Guidry decision, and in-
deed all the employee wrongdoing decisions that refused to adopt
a criminal fraud exception, create a "Catch 22" of conflicting
ERISA policies, and illustrate the way that the search for congres-
sional intent can lead to irreconcilable results in the employee
wrongdoing area.
Accordingly, the judicially interpreted exception advocated
herein is limited, like the criminal fraud amendment proposed
herein, to those cases in which either the plan sponsor or the plan
itself has been thieved. Of course, the adjudication that the al-
leged wrongdoer was in fact that thief would be a sine qua non to
any recovery.253
B. Federal Common Law-A Vehicle for Equity
The vehicle by which the judicially created exception could be
implied is the federal common law. The doctrine that a wrongdoer
should not profit from his crime is firmly embedded in the deepest
traditions of not only state but federal common law. 54
252 See supra part III.D. (offering hypothetical that demonstrates harm to benefi-
ciaries of pension plan).
253 See generally United States v. Gaudet, 966 F.2d 959 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. de-
nied, 113 S. Ct. 1294 (1993); United Metal Prods. Corp. v. Naitonal Banks of Detroit,
811 F.2d 297, 300 (6th Cir. 1987) (reciting facts in which such exception would apply);
Ellis v. Natl Bank v. Irving Trust Co., 786 F.2d 466, 469 (same); St. Paul Fire and
Marine Ins. Co. v. Cox, 752 F.2d 550 (11th Cir. 1985) (same); General Motors Corp. v.
Buha, 623 F.2d 455 (6th Cir. 1980) (same); Mills v. Mills, 790 F. Supp. 172, 177 (S.D.
Ohio 1992) (same); Vink v. SHV N. Am. Holding Corp., 549 F. Supp. 268 (S.D.N.Y.
1982) (same); Pomeranke v. Williamson, 478 N.W.2d 800, 801 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991)
(reciting facts in which such exception would not apply because neither plan nor spon-
sor was thieved).
254 See Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 151
(1968) (Marshall, J., concurring) ("The principle that a wrongdoer shall not be permit-
ted to profit through his own wrongdoing is fundamental in our juris-prudence.");
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As noted earlier, ERISA provides that "[n]othing in [its provi-
sions] shall be construed to alter, amend, modify, invalidate, im-
pair, or supersede any law of the United States."255 Furthermore,
"court[s are] empowered to formulate rules of law to govern vari-
ous aspects of the employee benefit field."256
This seems to indicate that an implied exception based on fed-
eral common law is feasible. As the courts that created an implied
exception for fraud in nonfiduciary employee wrongdoing cases,
which the Guidry Court overruled, did not present such an argu-
ment, there is no authority to indicate that such an exception
based on federal common law principles of equity would be
similiarly rejected.257 Furthermore, the arguments offered by the
courts that created the implied exception to ERISA's anti-aliena-
tion rule in the family support context before the enactment of
REA258 are no more persuasive than those for creating an implied
criminal fraud exception.
The broad argument offered by the courts for creating an ex-
ception for family support judgments was that ERISA's anti-alien-
ation and preemption provisions, as "generalized proscriptions,...
are not sufficient to infer that Congress meant to preclude the an-
cient family law right of maintenance and support and the issu-
Shoemaker v. Shoemaker, 263 F.2d 931, 932 (6th Cir. 1959) (recognizing "public pol-
icy founded upon the equitable principle that no person should be permitted to profit
from his own wrong"); Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Tull, 690 F.2d 848, 849 (4th
Cir. 1982) (citation omitted) ("Federal law recognizes that the beneficiary's claim is
barred by the equitable defense: 'No person should be permitted to profit from his own
wrong.' ").
255 29 U.S.C. § 1144(d) (1988).
256 In re C.D. Moyer Co. Trust Fund, 441 F. Supp. 1128, 1131 (E.D. Pa. 1977),
aff'd, 582 F.2d 1273 (3d Cir. 1978); see Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 56
(1987) (quoting 120 CoNG. REc. 29942 (1974) (statement of Senator Javits)) ("'It is
also intended that a body of Federal substantive law will be developed by the courts to
deal with the issues involving rights and obligations under... pension plans.' "); see
also RONALD J. CooKE, ERISA PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 8.04 (1989) ("[T]he courts
have an obligation to create a body of federal common law concerning aspects of em-
ployee benefit plans, and the guideposts in fashioning this body of federal common
law include the policies underlying ERISA and, possibly, principles of state law that
are compatible with national policy."). Certainly protection of plan participants is a
valid ERISA policy. Denying recovery for the employer who seeks restitution indi-
rectly on behalf of those participants does not promote this policy while recognizing
an exception would. Also, the state law policy that a wrongdoer should not profit from
his own crime is surely "compatible with national policy." Id. at 821.
257 See Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers Natl Pension Fund, 856 F.2d 1457 (10th
Cir. 1988), rev'd, 493 U.S. 365 (1990); Cox 752 F.2d at 550. Cf United Metal Prods.
Corp. v. National Bank of Detroit, 811 F.2d 297, 301 (Wellford, C.J., dissenting).
258 Id. at 301 (Wellford, C.J., dissenting).
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ance of process to enforce that right."25 9 Equally ancient are prin-
ciples of unjust enrichment, restitution, and the doctrine that a
wrongdoer should not profit from his crime.260 The second argu-
ment posited that the area of domestic relations has been tradi-
tionally left to the states, and, therefore, Congress could not have
meant to eliminate their powers to reign in this area.261 So too
has the area of criminal restitution been left to the states.262
Third, "ERISA's anti-assignment or alienation sections were in-
cluded only 'to protect a person and those dependent upon him
from the claims of creditors,' and not to insulate a breadwinner
from the valid support claims of spouse and offspring."263 It would
seem equally compelling that courts not insulate an embezzler
from the valid restitution claims of an employer seeking recovery
on behalf of other plan participants.
There is one argument which favored the creation of an im-
plied family support exception that is not present in the criminal
fraud context. Namely, the DOL supported an implied exception
for family support.2 64 Although it cannot be said that the DOL
supports the creation of a criminal fraud exception, neither can it
be said that it would disfavor the creation of one of the type advo-
cated herein. Because there is no risk of "bad boy" forfeiture
under the exception proposed herein, the DOL's argument against
a fraud exception does not apply here, and appellate court reliance
on it was and is inappropriate.26 5
Lastly, one court decried: "Until and unless Congress has
made it plain that it intended the absurd, unfair and unconsciona-
ble result contended for by [those who opposed the family support
exception] ... the Court will not leave the field, and will permit
the normal and routine enforcement machinery with respect to
outstanding support orders to function."266 It seems the Supreme
259 Cartledge v. Miller, 457 F. Supp. 1146, 1154 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
260 See supra note 254.
261 See Michael T. Murray, Note, The Fraud Exception to ERISA's Anti-Alienation
Provision: A Permissible Exercise of the Chancellor's Powers?, 57 FoRDHAM L. REV.
835, 843 (1989).
262 See Ann Haberfelde, Note, A Reexamination of the Non-Dischargeability of
Criminal Restitutive Obligations in Chapter 13 Bankruptcy, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 1517,
1565 (1992) ("Congress felt state interests in criminal restitution were supreme.").
263 Cartledge, 457 F. Supp. at 1156.
264 Id.
265 See supra part I. (offering more extensive discussion of this argument).
266 Cartledge v. Miller, 457 F. Supp. 1146, 1157 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (quoting Cogollos
v. Cogollos, 402 N.Y.S.2d 929, 930 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1978)).
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Court could adopt this position and let the restitution machinery
operate under the doctrine that a wrongdoer should not profit
from his own crime. This seems especially viable since, unlike
state family law support judgments, the equitable doctrine exists
in the federal common law and thus does not present a preemp-
tion problem.267
Furthermore, the arguments proffered by the various courts
against creating an implied exception for criminal fraud,26 while
valid within the context in which they were decided, are inapplic-
able to the present discussion, as the exception is to be recognized
only when the plan itself is injured, and when a court of law, not
an employer seeking bad-boy forfeiture, has declared that an em-
ployee has defrauded his employer to the detriment of all plan
participants.
The fraud exception proposed herein, whether realized by
congressional amendment or judicial creation, would not create an
endless "stream of suits and disputes" in which companies refuse
to pay pension benefits to allegedly disloyal employees. On the
contrary, a criminal adjudication of embezzlement or the like
would be a sine qua non to recovery.269 Courts of law rather than
employers would be exercising their discretion over that proceed-
ing, and the rigors of criminal procedure and constitutionally re-
quired due process would prevent the unbridled employer "bad
boy" overreaching that occurred prior to ERISA's enactment. Fur-
thermore, embezzlement and like crimes, by their nature, rise to
the level of felony, and therefore the concern that courts would not
267 See supra note 247; see also Langbein & Wolk, supra note 1, at 378 (sug-
gesting courts that created implied exception for family support judgments treated
preemption provision as if it only took effect in areas of "substantive or content
conflict").
268 See, e.g., Ellis Nat'l Bank v. Irving Trust Co., 786 F.2d 466, 471-72 (2d Cir.
1986).
Would the exception be available to only employers or pension plans, or also
to third parties allegedly victimized, such as creditors, the government or
even other employees? Would the exception withstand a charge that it
would favor business tort claimants over creditors? Would it pave the way
for exceptions for noncriminal fraud or conversion?
Id.; Vink v. SHV N. Am. Holding Corp., 549 F. Supp. 268, 273 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). The
court noted that carving out an exception "would start a boundless stream of suits and
disputes in which companies refuse to pay pension benefits to allegedly disloyal em-
ployees. Courts would then have to determine whether a fraud exception should ap-
ply only to felonies or whether it should apply to misdemeanors and acts of negligence
as well." Id.
269 See supra note 246 and accompanying text.
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know whether to apply the exception to misdemeanors is mis-
placed. Also, third parties; other than insurers of plan sponsors
acting pursuant to a right of subrogation, could not proceed with a
claim under either the proposed amendment or the judicially im-
plied exception, as such a claim would not comport with the goals
of ERISA. On the other hand, limiting the exception to employers
does comport with the stated goals and policies of ERISA,27 0 and
thus could "withstand a charge"27 1 that it favors employers over
creditors and tort victims. Similar reasoning was used to protect
the implied exception for family support judgments against
charges that it favored a plan participant's dependents over tort
victims and creditors.2 7 2 As was the case in that situation, a crim-
inal fraud exception is consistent with ERISA's policy of protect-
ing the plan and its beneficiaries. 273
Recognition of a criminal fraud exception under the limited
circumstances described herein-when the employer and law-
abiding plan participants are damaged by the wrongdoer's crimi-
nal actions-need not "pave the way"2 74 for any further exceptions
if judges refuse to let it. Even judges who have refused to create a
criminal fraud exception have expressed their confidence that the
judiciary is capable of performing the balancing that would be re-
quired by recognition of such an exception. 5
More significant, such an exception does not retard, but
rather furthers, the goals of ERISA. Recognition of an exception
would promote "the equitable character of ... [ERISA pension]
plans and their financial soundness" 2 76 in a way existing law does
not. Further, such recognition would foster "security in the work-
place" 27 7 and help secure the "financial soundness" of pension
plans, 8 which existing law does not. It would create "uniform
national treatment of pension benefits, 2 79 whereas existing law in
270 See supra note 2 (discussing policy behind ERISA and providing factual con-
text which compelled its passage).
271 Ellis, 786 F.2d at 471.
272 See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
273 See supra note 43 and accompanying text; see supra note 2.
274 Ellis Nat'l Bank v. Irving Trust Co., 786 F.2d 466, 472 (2d Cir. 1986).
275 United Metal Prods Corp. v. National Bank of Detroit, 811 F.2d 297, 300 (6th
Cir. 1987).
276 H.R. REP. No. 307, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 68 (1974).
277 St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co. v. Cox, 752 F.2d 550, 552 (11th Cir. 1985).
278 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (1988).
279 Patterson v. Shumate, 112 S. Ct. 2242, 2250 (1992).
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the employee wrongdoer area is anything but uniform.28 ° It would
even "assure that individuals who have spent their careers in use-
ful and socially productive work [as opposed to embezzlers] will
have adequate income to meet their needs when they retire,"28 '
since employers would have at least some means to recover their
losses on behalf of the plan participants. Ironically, existing law
instead assures that individuals who have spent their careers in
felonious and socially destructive work will have adequate income
to meet their needs in retirement.
Long ago, the Supreme Court stated: "All laws should receive
a sensible construction .... It will always, therefore, be presumed
that the legislature intended exceptions to its language, which
would avoid results of [an unjust, oppressive or absurd] charac-
ter."2 2 Recently, the Court has said that this caveat of statutory
construction is particularly applicable to labor legislation such as
ERISA.2 8 If the Supreme Court has the opportunity to review
another employee wrongdoing case, adherence to the wisdom of
this caveat should lead it to overrule Guidry and to create a crimi-
nal fraud exception to ERISA's anti-alienation rule.
CONCLUSION
Congress enacted ERISA in 1974 with an eye toward ensuring
that an employee and his dependents have adequate means to
meet their retirement needs. In the twenty years since, enforce-
ment of ERISA's anti-alienation provision has been a significant
means of achieving this goal. It seems inconceivable, however,
280 See supra part flI.D. (discussing hypothetical).
281 H.R. REP. No. 807, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.N.
4670, 4676 (emphasis added).
282 See Lau Ow Bew v. United States, 144 U.S. 47, 59 (1892) ("Nothing is better
settled than that statutes should receive a sensible construction, such as will effectu-
ate the legislative intention, and if possible, so as to avoid an unjust or an absurd
conclusion."); Church of Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892) ("It is
a familiar rule, that a thing may be within the letter of the statute and yet not within
the statute, because not within its spirit nor within the intention of its makers.");
United States v. Kirby, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 482, 486-87 (1868) (The reason of the law in
such cases should prevail over its letter."); United Metal Prods. Corp. v. National
Bank of Detroit, 811 F.2d 297, 300 (6th Cir. 1987) (citing United States v. Rutherford,
442 U.S. 544, 555 (1979)) ("Only when a literal construction of a statute yields results
so manifestly unreasonable that they could not fairly be attributed to congressional
design will an exception to statutory language be judicially implied.").
283 National Woodwork Mfrs. Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612, 619 (1967) (stating
that Holy Trinity principle is particularly applicable to construction of labor
legislation).
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that Congress intended the provision to allow an employee wrong-
doer, particularly one who is a pension plan fiduciary, to reap the
benefits of his crime at the expense of his employer and fellow em-
ployees. Indeed, the chaotic state of employee wrongdoing law
seems to indicate that Congress could not have intended such an
absurd result. Legislative action is best suited to correct the in-
justice in the employee wrongdoing area. Congressional inaction
to date need not be taken as tacit approval of the harsh result the
Guidry Court felt compelled to reach in order to preserve the pro-
tective effect of ERISA's bar on alienation for law-abiding pension-
ers. Since the policy behind ERISA amply supports the creation of
an implied criminal fraud exception for employee wrongdoing,
should the opportunity present itself, the Supreme Court should
reconsider its position and overrule Guidry.
Charles T. Caliendo, Jr.
